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Walls turned on their sides are bridges. / Las paredes de vuelta son puentes. 






The very act of dividing the earth and the sea surface by tracing the borders 
whether they are physical, virtual, or legal also allows for the appropriation of 
its resources. However, the resource which borders appropriate is not simply 
the proportioned territory. Rather, it is also the subjective claim of people to 
freely choose the territory in which to settle and the kind of relation they wish 
to establish with this territory. In other words, borders transform people’s 
claims to movement into a resource which can be appropriated and exchanged.  





















Migrant workers have made up the largest category of legal entrants to Canada over 
recent years, with 491,547 working in Canada in 2012. This rise of temporary “managed 
migration” has been organized through discriminatory classification systems that are 
deeply rooted in colonial categories of difference, sorting migrants according to 
nationality, gender, race, etc., while normalizing the exclusion of workers from full 
status. Although managed migration has come to dominate Canada’s bordering 
landscape, little research has explored how the colonial underpinnings of temporary 
labour facilitate the apartheid of mobility in Canada, and, in particular, how the 
neoliberalization of migration governance has also tightened state control over the 
movement of non-White workers. In this thesis, I unmap TFWP recruitment in the “Low-
Skill” Canada-Guatemala Pilot Project to highlight how temporary bordering practices 
perform and uphold the settler state through the stratified classification and management 
of migrant labour. I draw from a total of twelve qualitative interviews with all seven 
recruitment agencies active in Guatemala in 2014 and one agency in Canada, as well as 
from the lived experiences of thirty-nine Guatemalan workers shared over nineteen 
interviews. Through an interrogation of the day-to-day agency narratives and processes 
that forge the “good” worker and the migrant worker category in Guatemala and Canada, 
I trace how the TFWP is continuously constructed through the tangible practices of 
agencies, employers, and the Canadian state. I demonstrate how the expansion of the 
TFWP via recruitment has consequences far beyond Canada’s physical borders, driving 
workers into debt and precarity, fraudulently enlisting and blacklisting workers, and 
promoting overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, region, climate, morality, 
ability, etc. Through an examination of bordering actors and narratives, I denaturalize the 
unjust organization of managed movement and Canadian borders, unmapping the 
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 Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
A few summers ago, the landscape of the small farming village where my family lives 
began to visibly change. Migrants from Guatemala arrived to labour on the apple farms 
that have been the working heart of the village for generations. Gradually, more and more 
bicycles bordered the sidewalks; long lines to the Caisse Populaire emerged on dusky 
Friday mornings; tortillas and beans appeared regularly at the Saturday market; and every 
Thursday afternoon workers gathered together on the side of the road, waiting for the bus 
to take them to the local Walmart. The transformations in our village were similar to what 
was happening in other communities all over Québec and Canada – “temporary” workers 
were arriving in droves, streamlined by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.  
The arrival of migrant workers in the landscape where I grew up compelled me to 
investigate the lines and histories that have shaped present-day temporary labour 
migration. In particular, the unyielding attitudes of people in my community who 
consistently distinguished between migrants who, regardless of returning year after year, 
did “not belong,” and settlers, who seamlessly did. This despite our own relatively recent 
settlement on Wabanahkik1 territory. The more I learned about temporary work, however, 
the more I came to realize that it has long been a central feature of building colonial 
Canada. I began to understand that the unshaking sense of entitlement to Indigenous land 
and to “foreign” labour, as expressed by employers and community members alike, is 
part of a broader colonial narrative of “land and labour for the taking” essential to 
Canada’s very founding. This narrative is importantly reproduced on a daily basis, 
shaping access to mobility, with certain – White – bodies valued above others, 
delineating who may (not) belong and whose stories should be continually erased. The 
neatly-perched Victorian houses that blend into Appalachian hills, guarding inclusion to 
the land, are a testament to what is – and continues to be – silenced. 
Temporary immigration categories are deeply rooted in colonial notions of 
belonging that order mobility in Canada as well as globally. As a White settler who has 
                                                             
1 The regional county municipality Brome-Missisquoi of the Montérégie region where I grew up is on 
Missisquoi Abenaki territory, of the Wabanaki Conferacy. It is the area north of the ever-maintained US-
Canada border settled by British Loyalists in the 1770s and 1780s (Wilkin, 2014; The Cowasuck Band of the 
Pennacook Abenaki People, 2002).  
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freely migrated in Latin America for many years, the relationships that I built across 
borders drove me to reflect on my own unhindered ability to move and the stark 
inequalities which shape mobility and access. I came to wonder just how the Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) had evolved so quickly and family reunification 
programs been so swiftly cut, how the state has been able to construct and uphold the 
narratives that have allowed for the program’s unprecedented expansion – and also 
settlers’ indifference to the workers who continue to uphold the economy of our 
community – and how workers were tangibly being drafted into these programs. As 
someone who has also connected with individuals in Guatemala who have friends and 
family labouring in “my backyard,” I wondered: how did so many Guatemalans come to 
be part of so-called temporary labour streams? How did colonial state structures facilitate 
the legal precarity of “temporary” work?   
In this project, I therefore examine the colonial ideologies and bordering practices 
that naturalize differential classification in Canada’s TFWP. Specifically, I explore 
TFWP recruitment in the “low-skilled” Canada-Guatemala project to demonstrate how 
ongoing bordering practices continually perform and uphold the settler state through the 
stratified classification and management of migrant labour. By unmapping and making 
visible the processes, discourses and actors involved in the elaborate process of 
classifying and administering workers in the TFWP, I interrogate how borders are 
spatially and socially organized through shifting processes of categorization and 
containment. This unmapping work is valuable because it helps to make visible the 
violence of lawful dispossession that is – and has always been – essential to maintaining 
the colonial project of White Canadian nation-state building.  
This thesis addresses one part of colonial Canada’s neoliberal immigration 
apparatus: TFWP recruitment. A vital part of maintaining and expanding the temporary 
labour streams that exclude workers from full status in Canada, recruitment is a process 
that manifests the demands of Canadian employers and the Canadian state. As more and 
more workers of Colour are channelled into Canada’s temporary labour streams – 
alongside the ever-growing criminalization of migrants and militarization of borders – it 
is imperative to recognize both the new and long-established forms of colonial violence 
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enacted through neoliberal state structures such as the TFWP and Canada’s tightening 
immigration system.  
In examining the recruitment process, I hope to make tangible the abstract 
institutions that depoliticize the TFWP, disrupt the myth that Canadians are entitled to a 
tied “foreign” workforce, and unsettle the notion that it is “benevolent” for Canadian 
employers to offer Guatemalans temporary employment. For this to take place, it is 
necessary to historically ground TFWP structures within the profound colonialisms that 
have maintained and shaped settler-state relations and entitlements over many 
generations, as well as question the logics that have ordained the drawing of Canada’s 
colonial borders2. This inescapably also involves an inward examination of one’s own 
position as a (non-)subject of the Canadian nation and a need to both recognize and 
challenge the colonial foundations upon which one’s own mobility has been built – for 
we are also an iteration of our own colonial histories (Thobani, 2000 & 2007). 
Although there is an extensive body of literature on migrant labour and the 
Temporary Foreign Worker Program itself, little research has examined the colonial and 
racial underpinnings of the TFWP and how these foundations violently naturalize the 
exclusion of migrant workers today. Moreover, there has been little to no exploration of 
how recruitment in the TFWP is carried out beyond Canada’s demarcated borders, and 
how this might contribute to the structural precarity of temporary work as well as deepen 
and expand forms of colonial state violence. Finally, although Guatemalan workers 
comprise the largest migrant workforce in Québec over recent years, there has been 
limited examination of the institutional processes in the “low-skill” Guatemala project 
and how its configurations and daily workings connect to broader systems of colonialism 
and neoliberalization.  
I use the term “colonial” to refer to the ongoing, present-day forms of colonialism 
that, through the foundations of a White settler society and neoliberal capitalist 
expansion, continue to forcibly displace Indigenous peoples from their territories, 
threaten the self-determination of Indigenous communities, and attempt to assimilate 
                                                             
2 Moreover, it would also be necessary to examine all of the ways that Canada has actively been part of 
causing displacement in Guatemala, particularly through the expansion of the mining industry, a topic that I 
do not cover here as it would need to be a separate research project in itself.  
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Indigenous cultures and traditions. This process is ongoing in Canada and is central to the 
enactment of Canadian border controls. As such, I refer to Canada as a colonial settler 
state to highlight the colonial foundations upon which it has been built as well as the 
continuous colonialisms and racialized hierarchies that are central to its preservation, 
maintenance, and expansion (Walia, 2013; Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007). 
I have chosen not to use the word “foreign worker” throughout this document 
because, as pointed out by Nandita Sharma (2006), it is the very “foreignness”/Othering 
of workers in dominant discourse that works to construct their exclusion from Canadian 
society. Instead, I prefer the term “migrant worker”. I also use the word “temporary 
worker” or “temporary labour” due to the fact that workers are increasingly made 
precarious through temporal border restrictions (such as the four and four rule3), and 
temporariness itself is a form of constructed precarity. However, I recognize that many 
thousands of migrant workers are not temporary at all (in the temporal sense) and have 
been returning to Canada for many years – some for nearly a generation.  
To unmap the bordering processes of TFWP recruitment in Guatemala, this thesis 
is divided into eight sections: introduction, context, literature review, positioning and 
approach, bordering institutions, Ana’s story, narrating the “good” worker, and 
conclusions. I begin by situating the contemporary parameters of temporary migration, 
labour recruitment, and the Canada-Guatemala project with a contextual overview in 
chapter 2. This is followed by a deconstruction of the apartheid of mobility in Canada, as 
I retrace the interwoven colonial histories of Canadian borders, labour containment, 
White supremacy and displacement, and their connection to the growing role of migration 
management in Canadian immigration policy, through a review of anti-racist, migrant 
justice literature in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I describe my own positionality as a researcher 
and the theoretical framework, methodology, and methods I have adopted in this research 
process, as well as my experiences in carrying out fieldwork in Guatemala and Canada. 
In chapters 5 and 6, I interpret the agency and worker narratives that I collected during 
my fieldwork, depicting the institutions and organizational structures that carry out 
                                                             
3 The four and four rule came into effect on April 1, 2015, effectively blocking workers who have been 
returning to Canada for four years or more from returning to work in Canada. Workers will have to leave 
Canada for four years, and then may reapply to the program. This legislation even further impedes workers 
from organizing for better conditions or being able to access social benefits. 
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temporary labour recruitment in chapter 5 and examining the everyday processes of 
classification and containment used by recruiters to continuously shape the “good” 
worker subject via the migrant worker category in chapter 6. These chapters are divided 
by Ana’s story, a single mother’s experience with recruitment agency fraud in 
Guatemala, included to honour the many individuals who have paid money to come to 
Canada and never arrived, often incurring excessive debt as well as sacrificing their 
savings and homes in the process.   
While this thesis is not focused on labour organizing and instead critically 
examines the Canadian state and neoliberal agencies that increasingly implement state 
policy, I would also like to recognize the profound and diverse forms of resistance that 
migrant workers engage in on a daily basis both here in Canada and in Guatemala. 
Migrants are constantly negotiating the weight of Canadian borders; before, during, and 
after working in Canada. Despite the categorical imposition of difference by Canadians 
and the Canadian state, workers affirm again and again that they are much more than a 
number, a pair of arms, or a subclass, continuing to speak out and demand justice for all. 
We would do well to follow their lead.
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Chapter 2: CONSTRUCTING A SUBCLASS 
Since the inception of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP)4 in 2003, the 
number of migrant workers in Canada has surged from 179,780 to 491,547 in 2012 (CIC, 
2012)5. Temporary employment authorizations have made up the greatest portion of legal 
entrants to Canada every year since 2006, exceeding all other immigration categories to 
solidify a temporary-driven immigration system (Weiler & Otero, 2013; Marsden, 2011; 
Goldring, 2014). Migrant labour has become a pillar of Canada’s economic strategy: 
nearly 30% of all new jobs created in Canada between 2007 and 2011 were filled by 
“temporary” employees (Alarcon, 2013). In Québec6, over 3400 employers across a range 
of sectors use the TFWP, including hospitals, CLSCs7, federal and provincial ministries, 
municipalities, non-governmental organizations, and almost all universities and school 
boards (Grenier, 2013). However, most migrant workers are concentrated in the 
agricultural sector: roughly 9,000 of the province’s current 35,600 migrant workers are in 
agribusiness, with workers primarily from Guatemala, Mexico, and Honduras (Duplessis, 
2013). 
Migrant labour programs in Canada have historically consisted of bilateral 
agreements between nation-states, such as with the Caregiver Program and Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Program. The TFWP,8 however, enables employers to source 
workers from any country around the world9 without significant government oversight or 
country-to-country agreements10. Under the TFWP, workers are ranked as “high-skilled” 
                                                             
4 Previously called the “Pilot project for occupations requiring lower levels of formal training”. Canada’s long-
established Temporary Foreign Worker Program was originally initiated in 1973 was previously known as the 
Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) (Sharma, 2006).  
5 Since the Harper Government took office in 2006, Temporary Foreign Worker Programs have been “fast-
tracked” in immigration policy, with categories and priorities unilaterally “named”5 by the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration (Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010).  
6 Overall, the province of Québec has the fourth largest population of migrant workers, after Alberta, Ontario, 
and British Columbia (Le Ray, 2011). 
7 Local Community Service Centres (Centres locaux de services communautaires in French) provide health 
and social services in the province of Québec. 
8 Canada has changed the names and outward organizational arrangement of TFWP almost every year 
since its’ deregulated inception in 2003, adding programs to the TFWP umbrella as well as dividing and 
merging streams under different names. This makes it particularly difficult to monitor these programs as well 
as keep track of exactly how many migrants are arriving as temporary workers each year.   
9 Specifically, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) eliminated the need for bilateral 
agreements (Preibisch, 2010; Goldring, 2014). 
10 The Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) and the In-Home Caregiver Program (previously 
known as the Live-In Caregiver Program) are now part of the TFWP; both were created in the 1970s and so 
involve bilateral agreements (Pang, 2013).   
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(levels 0, A and B) or “low-skilled” (C or D), according to Canada’s National 
Occupational Classification (NOC). “Low-skilled” positions are most common in 
agriculture and the food sector, as well as other primary industry occupations such as 
construction and resource extraction, and make up about 30 per cent of all migrant 
workers in Canada (HRSDC, n.d; CIC, 2012). This thesis will focus on the recruitment of 
“low-skilled” migrant workers from Guatemala. 
Although the TFWP has been under growing public criticism in recent years, 
government modifications to the program have largely been superficial in that they do not 
actually support the workers who are made most vulnerable by its structures. On the 
contrary, the state’s “putting Canadians first” stance has worked to fuel racism and anti-
immigrant bigotry, using migrant workers as a scapegoat to turn attention away from the 
very real way that precarity is constructed by the state while also excluding these same 
workers from access to the jobs that they have come to rely on. Many migrant workers 
have been “permanently temporary” for decades, returning to Canada year after year to 
complete the same “short-term” contract job11 (Sharma, 2006; Preibisch, 2007). Rather 
than create meaningful paths to permanent status, the state has made migrants more 
precarious through recent reforms: policies such as the four and four rule, shorter stays in 
Canada, and increased application costs, put workers arriving through the TFWP low-
skilled stream12 in a more vulnerable – and temporary – position than ever, particularly 
due to the burgeoning for-profit webs that have come to constitute Canadian “managed 
migration” (ESDC, 2014; Migrant Workers Alliance for Change, 2014).  
Migrant workers in Québec are primarily recruited through the low-skilled 
agricultural stream of the TFWP, formerly known as the Guatemala Pilot Project or Low-
Skill Pilot Program (LSPP). The LSPP was initiated in 2003 through a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the International Organization for Migration (IOM-
Guatemala), an inter-governmental migration management organization based in 
Guatemala, and the Business Foundation for the Recruitment of Foreign Agricultural 
Workers (FERME), a private agricultural employers association for labour recruitment in 
                                                             
11 Rather than merely fulfilling “supplemental shortages”, employers are using the program as a permanent 
means to meet their labour needs, restricting the agency and bargaining power of workers and unions to 
keep business costs low (Cragg, 2011; Preibisch, 2007; UFCW, 2011).   
12 “High-skilled” workers and workers arriving via bilateral agreements are exempt from these restrictions.  
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Québec (Vargas, 2010). With the guidance of FERME and the IOM, Québec was the first 
province to allow for the insourcing of agricultural labour outside of the existing Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), and remains the largest employer of agricultural 
migrants arriving through the TFWP (FOCAL & IMRC, 2010; UFCW, 2013). Because 
there is no bilateral agreement between Canada and Guatemala, the infrastructure 
managing the program has largely been private, multiplying the number of actors 
involved in contracting workers and in turn making labour relationships more precarious, 
with fewer or “less effective” rights than SAWP (Fudge, 2011).  
The Low-Skill Pilot Project stream has grown over 2100% since its inception in 
2002, making it the fastest growing program out of all temporary labour categories (CIC, 
2013). Under the LSPP, employers may hire migrants for up to 12 months.13 Workers are 
classified as “low-skilled,” have no path to permanent residency, are tied to their 
employer, paid (less than14) minimum wage, and typically do not have full access to 
labour protections, social services, or the benefits that they pay into. Workers must be 
housed either on their employer’s property or in a nearby area.15 The precarious, tied and 
complaint-based structure of the program is intensified by the fact that employers have 
the power to deport workers at any time (Hughes, 2014). Over 90% of all new Québec 
jobs created in 2011 were for migrant workers – 70% of whom were Guatemalan 
(Canadian Labour Congress, 2013). Since 2009, (Indigenous) Guatemalans have become 
the preferred “foreign” workforce in Québec, and are the largest groups of incoming 
“low-skilled” migrants in the province, with nearly 5,000 workers entering Québec under 
the TFWP in 2013 and 65% of Québec farms employing Guatemalan workers16 
(Canadian Labour Congress, 2013; WALI, 2011; CIC, 2013; St. Amour, 2012; Amigo 
Laboral, 2013) (See figure 1 and appendix 1).  
The sudden rise of Guatemalan workers in the Québec labour market can be 
traced to a growing demand from agricultural employers to “diversify” the workforce 
                                                             
13 The LSPP initially permitted 12-month contracts; this was later increased to 24 months, giving employers 
an advantage in using the LSPP over the more established SAWP, which limited contracts to eight-month 
periods (Hughes, 2014).  The time limit was reinstated to 12 months under TFWP modifications made in 
2014 (ESDC, 2014).  
14 Although migrant workers should be paid at least minimum wage according to TFWP regulations, workers 
have reported being paid much less, or even not being paid by the hour and rather by the pound of produce 
or chicken that they deliver (Guatemalan worker, 05/14; Guatemalan worker 01/14).  
15 In practice, most workers are housed on the property of their employer (Faraday, 2014).  
16 There were over 6,000 LMIAs submitted for employing Guatemalan workers in 2013 (CIC, 2013).  
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beyond Mexican and Caribbean workers who had already been working seasonally in the 
province for decades – since the signing of bilateral agreements with Mexico and Jamaica 
in 1974 and 1966, respectively – coupled with the establishment of the 1995 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the active presence of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) in Guatemala. FERME – which already facilitated the 
recruitment of workers within SAWP – pushed for a means to open up seasonal labour to 
countries further south of Mexico in the early 2000s, specifically to Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador. GATS, a multilateral free trade agreement that authorized international 
trade in services for World Trade Organization (WTO) members, meanwhile allowed for 
the temporary entry of workers from member countries into Canada with a Labour 
Market Impact Assessment (LMIA), expanding possibilities for labour insourcing beyond 
existing bilateral agreements and in effect making such agreements obsolete (CIC, 2014). 
The long-standing role of the IOM-Guatemala in providing administrative support to 
Guatemalan refugees who wished to go to Canada and the organization’s consequent 
knowledge of Canada’s immigration system, in turn, quickly made Guatemala FERME’s 
most obvious choice for a Pilot Project, resulting in the signing of an MOU between the 
Québec-based foundation and the IOM-Guatemala in 2003. 
 
FIGURE 1. GUATEMALAN MIGRANT WORKERS TO CANADA, 2002-2013 
 












The relatively recent boom in temporary labour migration to Canada has more 
broadly been facilitated through the neoliberal structures of the TFWP, which have now 
greatly extended beyond the Pilot Project and depend on private, for-profit actors to 
ensure a steady supply of flexible labour to Canadian employers. Part of a broader 
neoliberalization of state policies, Canadian laws have expanded and fast-tracked 
temporary labour streams while devolving the management of migration and labour 
practices to private actors. This privatization of both border management and labour 
control mechanisms has produced new opportunities for capital accumulation, as a 
growing web of private actors increasingly profit from the im/mobility of workers. High 
employer demand for migrant labour, coupled with the privatized framework of the 
TFWP, has, in particular, generated an important third party for administering and 
transferring temporary migratory flows to Canada: private recruitment agencies17.  
Private agencies represent the interests of Canadian employers who seek to expand profit-
making opportunities by securing low cost “good” workers who will return to their 
country of origin following the end of their contract. Without a direct relationship 
between employers and sending governments, recruiters have become critical actors in 
enabling Québec’s agricultural industry to obtain cheap, specialized, and efficient 
transnational labour (Faraday, 2014). By seeking out, classifying, and containing 
migrants who wish to work in Canada, agencies effectively implement Canadian 
immigration policy and so have come to be important actors in defining Canada’s shifting 
borders of differential inclusion/exclusion.   
A key player in the organization and implementation of the Pilot Project in 2003, 
the IOM was the only recruiter of migrant workers to Canada from Guatemala until 2009. 
An inter-governmental agency committed to “the orderly and humane management of 
migration,” the IOM has been called a leader in the ever-growing “humanitarian 
complex” of migration (IOM, 2015; Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). The organization 
was the first to develop an expertise in the recruitment, administration, and management 
of Guatemalan migrant workers to Canada, arranging candidate selection and 
implementing bordering practices in adherence with Canadian immigration requirements 
                                                             
17 Service Canada describes recruiters as being TFWP experts and representatives for employers: providing 
TFWP advice, completing TFWP applications, and even communicating with the Canadian government – via 
ESDC – on the employer’s behalf (ESDC, 2015). 
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and employer hiring criteria (IOM, n.d.). Over time, new recruiters – most of whom are 
former IOM employees – have followed the organization’s lead and joined the market for 
recruiting temporary labour, competing for Canadian contracts as well as profiting from 
the high demand in Guatemalan out-migration to Canada. In 2009, FERME opened its 
own recruitment organization in Guatemala City in partnership with former IOM-
Guatemala director Günther Müssig: Amigo Laboral. The following year, ACADEC, a 
campesino “development” association, also began recruiting to bring Guatemalan 
workers to Canada. After the IOM was finally expelled from Guatemala for corruption 
charges in 201318, five new organizations quickly surfaced: Human Resources Out 
(HRO), Apoyo Integral al Migrante (AIM), Canadian Job, ComuGuate, and ACADEC-
Guatemala (ACADECGUA), three of whom are run by former IOM staff.   
The proliferation of private recruitment agencies – in Guatemala as well as 
elsewhere – has created new possibilities for the exploitation of workers as an increasing 
number of institutions19 take part in sorting and processing candidates, amassing vast 
reserves of low-cost labour that are ever-awaiting travel to an imagined Canada 
(Hennebry, 2008). As explained by researcher Fay Faraday:  
As labour migration has increased, private recruiters have emerged to 
facilitate the flow of workers from one country to another. Exploitation in this 
relationship is able to flourish precisely because of the structural and income 
inequalities…and migrant workers' location in that power imbalance (as cited 
by Hussan, 2013b: para. 3).  
 
Workers are typically charged considerable sums in “user fees” and have reported an 
array of abuses from recruiters, from widespread fraud to the misrepresentation of jobs or 
immigration requirements, the withholding of information, and extensive pay deductions 
                                                             
18 Although there is no official information from the organization itself as to why the IOM was expelled from 
Guatemala, newspapers cite testimonies to the Ministerio Público that state the IOM was suspected of 
money-laundering, redirecting hundreds of thousands of dollars in public funds into their own pockets, and 
other “administrative anomalies” for over a decade. The IOM gradually amassed state-sponsored “rural 
development projects” all over Guatemala that went far beyond their mandate, including but not limited to 
constructing stadiums and sports complexes, carrying out hospital reparations, building schools and roads, 
etc., many of which were badly managed, never finished, or dangerously built (“Corrupción en la OIM”, 2014; 
“IVE denuncia a OIM por presuntas operaciones de lavado de dinero”, 2006; “La OIM no da explicaciones”, 
2013; “Más anomalías en obras administradas por OIM”, 2008; “OIM no responde sobre fondos 
desaparecidos en Fonapaz”, 2013; “Müssig: ‘OIM nunca ha negado datos’”, 2000).  
19 Some actors include: Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Guatemalan Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Embassy of Canada in Guatemala, and the 
Embassy of Mexico, FERME, and the IOM, as well as individual employers and private agencies, to name a 
few (Vargas, 2010). 
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(Faraday, 2014; Flecker, 2013). This process is not only state-sanctioned but state-
powered through the unregulated, serpentine structures of the Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Le Ray, 2011; Peck, 2004). 
 





Recruitment is an important node in Canada’s system of temporary managed 
migration because it establishes the initial parameters for labour exploitation and it is 
widespread, often involving workers who never make it to Canada but have paid 
thousands of dollars for the trip. Recruiters form the terms on which the employer-
employee relationship is later built, acting as intermediaries that importantly control 
access to the border and Canada’s labour market. Managing the complex process for 
workers to be able to cross international borders, agencies build essential networks 
between sending communities and Canadian-based employer associations. They 
accordingly hold inordinate power over work access, controlling what information is 
available to workers and determining “what workers must do – and pay – to secure work 
in Canada” (Faraday, 2014, 6-7). As recruitment organizations multiply, employers have 
a wider market of labour agencies to choose from, pushing recruiters to lower employer 
access fees to accumulate contracts while raising these same costs for workers20. 
Agencies seek out particular kinds of labourers to meet the tailored demands of Canadian 
employers, targeting workers in specific – mainly Indigenous – communities in 
Guatemala, with nearly half of all recruited workers coming from the predominantly 
Maya Kaqchiquel department of Chimaltenango (PNUD-Guatemala, n.d.; Amigo 
Laboral, 2013; Wampui Sana, 2012: 59; Hughes, 2014) (See appendix 3). 
In Guatemala, the transnational outsourcing of temporary labour can be traced to a 
long history of imperial and colonial state-driven displacement and enclosure that has 
pushed the region’s Indigenous Maya population to be the protagonists of migration. A 
country with the second highest unequal land distribution in Latin America – with 60% of 
arable land owned by just 2% of producers and over 50% of rural plots so small that they 
cannot support subsistence agriculture – and some of the highest levels of regional 
economic inequality and violence, Guatemala has a deep history of colonization that has 
since its’ founding depended on a variety of measures “for binding and coercing 
                                                             
20 In order to access workers through the “low-skilled” stream, Canadian employers must submit a Labour 
Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) and, if the LMIA is positive, typically hire through a recruiter based in 
Canada, who in turn communicates with a Guatemalan counterpart to enlist workers. Canadian-based 
recruiters charge employers an administrative fee and then pay recruiters in Guatemala to engage in hiring 
and the migration process. Guatemala-based recruiters, in turn, typically charge workers a service fee – 




[Indigenous] labour” for capitalist gain (Wambui Sana, 2012; Hughes, 2014; McCreery, 
1983, 736).  
Following the invasion phase of the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, 
Guatemala became dominated early on by a colonial export economy geared towards a 
series of cash crops, beginning with cacao, indigo and cochinal (Fox, 2015). Primitive 
accumulation depended on the exploitation and containment of Indigenous labour 
through systems such as the encomienda and repartimiento, which allowed the Spanish 
Crown to exact tribute from Indigenous peoples in the form of personal services or labour 
and facilitated landowner requests for labour through colonial authorities, respectively, 
forcing the Maya to work on farms, in mines, as domestic help, etc. (Fox, 2015; Lovell, 
2005). The coerced resettlement and concentration of Indigenous communities into 
congregaciones (or reducciones), meanwhile, made labour more readily available to 
settlers while also clearing traditional lands for capitalist expropriation. Together, these 
systems “set up the initial ethno-racial institution of structural oppression” that continues 
to mark present-day Guatemala (Fox, 2015, 154). 
Coffee export capitalism beginning in the 1870s is widely seen as the second 
wave of colonization that further fractured the autonomy of Indigenous communities in 
Guatemala to reinforce state control over labour and land and pave the way for a system 
of seasonal temporary labour (McCreery, 2011; Grandin, 2000; Lovell, 2005). The 1877 
mandamientos – based on the colonial repartimiento – authorized a forced labour law that 
obligated Indigenous communities to provide seasonal workers to coffee plantations 
while also advancing debt peonage21 and vagrancy laws, effectively binding Indigenous 
peoples to large-scale fincas (Grandin, 2000; McCreery, 2011). Liberal reforms shaped 
“the order and orientation of the modern [Guatemalan] state,” forcibly converting 
Indigenous communities into temporary labour reserves that were relied on intensely 
during harvest season while also accelerating the privatization of communal lands22 
(Stepputat, 2008, 344). This consolidated “a highly exploitative, militarized plantation 
                                                             
21 Rural labourers were required to carry a libreta (workbook) that included a copy of their contract and a 
record of the debts, credits and number of days worked (McCreery, 2011). 
22 If communities could not produce a valid title to their land – which was issued by the liberal state – settlers 
producing for export could take over those lands (McCreery, 1983).  
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economy” that became increasingly enforced through the army and militia (Grandin, 
Levenson, & Oglesby, 2011, 109). 
Growing resistance and demands from Indigenous communities eventually 
culminated in what many describe as a third wave of colonial repression in Guatemala: la 
violencia, a 36 year period of state-instituted violence that aimed to impede any 
meaningful redistribution of land, suppress workers, and further capitalist development 
through export production and industrialization. Following a US-backed coup in 1954, 
decades of state-backed violence23 counted “more than 600 massacres, 200,000 deaths, 
the displacement of 1.5 million people24 and tens of thousands of disappearances,” 
through physical violence and scorched earth campaigns, mainly in the countryside 
(Manz, 2008, 152; Fox, 2015). This period laid the foundation for Guatemala’s extractive 
industry25 and initiated neoliberal restructuring, opening the country up to foreign 
investment through “new waves of enclosure, territorialisation, and legalization” that 
intensified following the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords26 (Granovsky-Larsen, 2013, 
346; Fox, 2015).  
The colonial violence that shapes Guatemala – and Canada, as I will later 
demonstrate – continues to be neoliberalized today, with the encroachment of 
transnational corporations, open trade policies, and private entities backed by the state, 
what Goldin and de Tejada (1993) call “economic internal colonialism” under global 
capitalism. Ongoing persecution and state violence have become the norm, with rural 
communities often targeted by private security firms for defending their lands and 
opposing the expansion of foreign – mostly Canadian – mining projects27 and 
agribusiness, including biofuel, sugarcane and palm oil plantations (Grandin, 2011). The 
                                                             
23 Over a 36-year period, 93% of deaths were caused by the state and state-backed paramilitary groups 
(Fox, 2015). 
24 There are many cases of large landowners and state-backed development projects taking over communal 
lands for export, energy production, or mining, such as with the case of the Río Negro massacre in 1982 in 
Baja Verapaz (Granovsky-Larsen, 2013). 
25 Guatemala’s first mining code was drafted in 1965 in collaboration with a US nickel mining company; 
military repression was widely used against those that opposed mining throughout the internal armed conflict 
and continues today (Fox, 2015).  
26 This included market-led land reform: rather than facilitate any structural redistribution of power/land, 
market-assisted agrarian reform exacerbated existing power relations by allowing large landowners to 
benefit from land sales and title regularization, able to sell their worst land for inflated prices and effectively 
driving smallholders (further) into debt (Granovsky-Larsen, 2013).  
27 A new mining law was drafted just two weeks following the Peace Accords; the legislation effectively 
made it easier and more profitable for foreign companies to pursue resource extraction in Guatemala (Fox, 
2015). At least 88% of mines in Guatemala are Canadian-owned (Amnesty International, 2014).  
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appropriation of communal lands for resource-based accumulation projects continues to 
spread, while the containment of flexible labour remains central to the profitability of 
these projects. Despite widespread impoverishment and ever-growing repression from the 
state and foreign interests, workers continue to struggle to secure a living wage and 
combat the flexibilization of labour amidst high levels of unemployment (Alonso-
Fradejas, 2015; Grandin, Levenson, & Oglesby, 2011). As voiced by scholars Peter 
Benson, Edward Fischer, and Kedron Thomas (2008: 50): “A legacy of state violence, 
deep socioeconomic inequality, the penetration of extractive industries, the erosion of 
political and social infrastructures, and disparate access to health care, education, and life 
chances” have shaped the conditions that force many to migrate.  
With widespread insecurity, violence, and structural exclusion in Guatemala, 
migration has become a vital means of survival for hundreds of thousands of 
Guatemalans who move both internally and across borders each year (Sieder, 2011). 
While rural labourers continue to migrate seasonally to costal plantations, many also 
work on plantations in neighbouring countries, the majority of whom cross into Mexico. 
Although some migrants go abroad legally, most are undocumented, with tens of 
thousands of mostly Indigenous, smallholding Guatemalans making the treacherous 
journey north each year to perform agricultural or domestic labour or to work in the 
informal economy. Every day more than 300 migrants leave Guatemala and 200 migrants 
are forcibly returned from the United States and Mexico (IOM, 2012, 17). Supporting 
more than 1.5 million people, remittances are a central pillar of the Guatemalan economy 
(IOM, 2012).  
Since the creation of the Low Skill Pilot Project in 2003, a growing number of 
Guatemalan workers have been migrating to Canada under the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program (TFWP). In many ways, the TFWP is a continuum of the seasonal 
migrations that have marked Guatemala for nearly five hundred years, with recruiters and 
employers alike hailing temporary labour as a legal means to foster “development” for a 
poverty-stricken Indigenous majority, ordering labour precarity through the infrastructure 
of the state and private actors. While temporary employment does offer an important 
means for workers to obtain remittances, it effectively facilitates and reinforces a multi-
tiered labour system in Canada that institutionalizes disposability on the basis of 
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nationality, race, gender, class and ability (Walia, 2013). In legally making migrants 
“permanently temporary,” ever-flexible, and precarious by systematizing their 
deportability and containment, the TFWP also continues the cycle of imperialist 
dispossession and displacement that has since conquest forced so many Guatemalans to 




Chapter 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The recruitment of Guatemalan workers to Canada is based upon narratives that 
reproduce the founding settler mythologies of an imagined White Canadian nation 
established by the British and the French. This narrative of the “two solitudes” erases the 
many histories of racial exclusion that have been – and continue to be – violently enacted 
through Canada’s colonial project (Austin, 2013). Colonial mythologies dominate 
structures of access and un/belonging, profoundly shaping labour hierarchies and 
categories of immigration, with narratives of “racial supremacy as national superiority” 
continually performed in the everyday selection, classification, and ranking of those who 
apply to work in Canada (Thobani, 2007: 249). To effectively explore the recruitment of 
temporary labour and the enactment of Canada’s borders, therefore, it is necessary to 
historically contextualize TFWP structures within the colonialisms that have maintained 
and shaped narratives of legality, morality, mobility, and the imagined Canadian nation. 
These narratives have formed the foundation from which the spatial and social production 
of difference can take place.  
To examine these foundations as well as more broadly situate Guatemalan 
migrant labour in Canada and globally, the following is divided into two sections: i) 
narrating the settler state and ii) neoliberal migration management. I have chosen to 
frame the literature in this way to demonstrate how colonial logics uphold the nation-
state, and in turn reveal how capitalist relations depend on these same logics. Migration 
management is presented as necessary for optimal capital gain, but it is built upon the 
othering of migrants, who will always be “foreign” in Canada and so are differentiated 
from Canadians despite working on the same territory (Sharma, 2006). It is the 
“foreignness” of workers – established through White settler mythologies – that 
legitimizes their state-constructed precarity. Rather than first focus on the broader 
capitalist system and how it interacts with Canadian policy in a political economy or 
systems-based approach (see Robinson, 2007; Wallerstein, 2004; Hanley & al., 2009; 
etc.), I start by unmapping the histories and relations of domination that have normalized 
discriminatory labour structures and continue to tangibly enable capitalism to operate in 
Canada. At its core, capitalism is rooted in racism and colonialism and relies on the 
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ongoing theft of Indigenous land and labour, and so this is the point from which I begin. 
This approach is brazenly personal, feminist and anti-colonial, inspired by the work of 
predominantly women of colour writers, namely: Nandita Sharma, Harsha Walia, Sunera 
Thobani, and Sherene Razack. It is also hopeful: in recognizing our complicity and 
position within these histories and relationships, it becomes possible to challenge colonial 
constructions on both an individual and systemic level and make space for new stories 
that recast the past and present.  
After establishing the way in which settler state narratives organize and justify the 
production of difference and border controls, structuring the racialization of labour and 
preservation of White supremacy in Canada, I turn to a broader systems-based approach 
in the second part of my literature review to examine the intersections of settler 
colonialism, neoliberalism and managed movement. As the mobility of particular – 
racialized – groups becomes increasingly contained through migration management 
institutions in Canada and around the world that ironically sell movement as a commodity 
“for the benefit of all,” it is more and more apparent how border controls favour the 
mobility of the (White) few at the expense of the immobility of the (racialized) majority. 
Global capitalism reinforces and exacerbates colonial relations of exploitation through 
the enforcement and expansion of border management. As expressed by journalist Dawn 
Paley (2013): “Far from preventing violence, the border is in fact the reason it occurs” (as 
cited in Walia, 2013, 5). State-sanctioned managed migration, in particular, has become a 
growing means to uphold colonial designs of citizenship, capitalizing on people’s claims 
to migration and survival while expanding the market for temporary labour. I will explore 
these ideas for the remainder of this section.  
 
NARRATING THE SETTLER STATE 
Race has shaped the modern nation-state since its conceptual and institutional emergence. 
As David Theo Goldberg writes (2002: 4): “Racial configuration fashions the terms of the 
founding myth, the fabrication of historical memory, necessary to both the discursive 
production and ideological rationalization of modern state power”. Race has been – and 
continues to be – fundamental to the creation, expansion, and transformation of the 
nation-state, whose formation has been premised on “the ideological work of 
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manufacturing sameness” (Anderson, 2013: 36). While the measures and modes of racial 
exclusions have varied over time and space, the state has always been organized to 
reinforce racial difference, keeping those who have been classified as “racially 
characterized others” physically out of national space or else “regulating otherness” 
within spaces that are defined or controlled by the state. According to Goldberg, 
colonizing states, in particular, work to create and propagate difference to reproduce 
sameness within settler populations, externalizing racialized groups to reinforce White 
colonial homogeneity.28 
The nation state is not a natural entity, but has been constructed through specific – 
ideological – practices grounded in a fictive “racial mythology” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 
1991; Goldberg, 2002; Thobani, 2007; Anderson, 2013). Notions of race have been used 
to build the nation-state, fabricating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion through 
processes of colonialism and racialization that have in turn fortified systems of 
domination. Étienne Balibar (1991:42) argues that racism itself originated in colonial 
nationalism, “produced and reproduced within the space constituted by conquest and 
colonization”. Montreal historian David Austin (2013), in turn, describes race as a 
product of slavery and colonialism, emphasizing the importance of colonial narratives in 
upholding the racial contours of the nation and the power of state rule. In Austin’s words: 
“[State] power is facilitated and exercised through the production of truth, through 
contrived narratives designed to maintain power, order, and authority, to make laws and 
to produce wealth” (Austin, 2013: 48). 
National mythologies lay the foundation for constructing narratives that naturalize 
the settler state, eclipsing the violence and devastation of colonialism, past and present29 
(see Austin, 2013; Thobani, 2007; Walia, 2013; Sharma, 2006; Razack, 2002; Buck, 
2012; etc.). As voiced by Brackette Williams (1989: 430): “As nation-builders, 
mythmakers become race-makers”. Hegemonic colonizer narratives forge the parametres 
of White belonging and entitlement while also normalizing racial violence and exclusion 
towards non-Whites to continually produce a colonial “Canada”. “Narrative and power 
                                                             
28 For example, Canada’s recent Barbaric Cultural Practices Act or Québec’s 2014 Charter of Values are 
pieces of colonial legislation specifically targeting racialized immigrant communities in Canada.  
29 Nationalist myths are also manifested in state school curriculums, official language(s), national holidays, 
flags, monuments, literature etc. (Buck, 2012).  
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go hand in hand”: although Canada is a White settler colony founded upon the 
displacement, dispossession and commodification of Indigenous lives, resources and 
lands – as well as the indentureship of racialized im/migrants30 – these processes are 
omitted and obscured in dominant discourse, concealed beneath the image of a virtuous 
“beginning” (Austin, 2013: 28). In the words of Sunera Thobani (2007: 34):  
The foundational narrative of Canadian nationhood is a romance of 
pioneering adventure, of wild lands and savage peoples, of discovery and 
enterprise, of the overcoming of adversity through sheer perseverance and 
ingenuity. Europeans discovered an unknown continent and Europe’s intrepid 
masses came to it: a new people building a new world.  
Applying colonial legal concepts such as terra nullius (‘empty land’ for the taking) 
and terra incognitia (which gave Europeans ‘legal title’ to the land they illegally 
occupied), White settlers have vindicated themselves as “law-upholding” subjects 
through the enforcement of colonial law while simultaneously “imposing illegality” on 
those whom they have colonized and dispossessed (Thobani, 2007). Legality has as such 
always been “a construct of the powerful, not of justice” (King Alfred, 2015). Colonial 
sovereignty has fundamentally been based upon an order of absolute violence that denies 
colonized peoples self-determination within their own lands – lands that they have moved 
through “since time immemorial” (Walia, 2013). The institution of colonial law has 
facilitated the masking and rationalization of this violence, as well as its systemization. 
This process is inevitably racial, for: “the violence necessary to bring into being the 
colonial order fashioned and propagated a racial order” (Thobani, 2007: 38; Razack, 
2002).  
 
Classification, Containment, & Borders 
Classifying schemas have long been prevailing modes of what Goldberg calls “racial 
governance” in the modern state, working “to exclude and by extension include in 
racially ordered terms, to dominate through the power to categorize differentially and 
hierarchically, to set aside by setting apart” (Goldberg, 2002: 9). Categorical “racial 
management” has been administered through law and policy, codifying race through its 
                                                             
30 Specifically, the enslavement of Indigenous peoples, peoples of African descent and Chinese im/migrants 
in the 19th and 20th centuries (Austin, 2013).  
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institutionalization in and through the state, the legal system, bureaucratic apparatuses, 
and national imaginings. Populations are “ordered” and demarcated through hierarchies 
of citizenship, with those that fall outside of assimilative categories differentiated and 
contained or else materially excluded. Goldberg asserts that states increasingly perform 
“the carceral logics of containability, confinement, and control” to “enclos[e] race 
within” rather than just physically prohibit “undesirables” from entering national space 
(Goldberg, 2002: 10 & 167). White supremacy operates in much the same way, 
premising racial control not upon “the absence of ‘non-whites’ from white space” but 
from “their structured exploitation within it” (Goldberg, 2002: 208). Goldberg describes 
this system of state-legislated containerizing as the “new regulator state”, a process that is 
“mediated more and more by extra-state institutional legality and geopolitical economies” 
(Goldberg, 2002: 260). 
Sociologist Bridget Anderson (2013: 36) asserts: “Colonialism was key to the 
creation of ‘race’ and racial categories…[and] to the creation of Whiteness as a national 
identity”. Differential categorization has always been central to the racial – and colonial – 
order in Canada, with racialized hierarchies of un/belonging produced to build and then 
preserve a White settler nation (see Razack, 2002; Mawani, 2002; Oikawa, 2002; Nelson, 
2002). White national space has been fabricated through legal systems of racial restriction 
infused with moral authority that have shifted in appearance over time: from the near 
erasure of Indigenous peoples’ histories to their legislated classification and containment 
in the Indian Act, the lawful banning and regulation of “non-preferred” races in Canadian 
immigration policy31, and the institutionalization of Canada’s migrant worker programs 
beginning with a bilateral agreement with Jamaica in 1966 – shortly after racial criteria 
was officially eliminated from Canadian immigration policy for the first time (Austin, 
2013; Thobani, 2007; Sharma, 2006; Walia, 2013).  
With Canadian national identity “deeply racialized since its inception in colonial 
violence,” Canada’s juridical order – through the Indian Act, 19th and 20th century 
immigration policy, and other pieces of racist legislation – has historically organized 
national space to sustain the colonial hierarchies that maintain White supremacy, 
                                                             
31 Such as: the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act, the 1923 Exclusion Act, the 1908 Continuous Passage 
Requirement, various head taxes, and official the institutionalization of race in the 1910 Immigration Act, etc. 
(Thobani, 2007).  
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transforming Indigenous peoples into outsiders/outlaws in their own territories, and 
dividing “insiders” and “outsiders” along colonial lines32 (Thobani, 2007: 249). Canadian 
immigration law, in particular, has been a central means of upholding settler sovereignty 
– and, accordingly, White supremacy –, subordinating racialized im/migrants to exalted 
Whites through an ever-expanding regime of classification and containerization33 
(Razack, 2002).  
Canada has historically asserted tight control over which groups could enter 
national territory and their conditions of entry, framing race and colour as “problems” to 
be controlled through particular spatial and temporal restrictions (Satzewich, 1988). 
Intrinsically bound with Canada’s White racial project, immigration and labour policies 
have been important race-making tools, delineating who may be excluded and thus 
exploited through categorical difference, for: “super exploitation requires the abrogation 
of rights” (Buck, 2012, 108; Brodkin, 1998). Settler demand for cheap labour – to further 
land expropriation and capital accumulation – has actively structured the boundaries of 
the nation-state, allocating and immobilizing racialized migrants to particular sites in 
production relations, such as with Chinese and Japanese labourers in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries (Razack, 2002; Oikawa, 2002; Satzewich, 1988 & 1989).  
The creation of categorical difference through the institutionalization of 
temporariness has long been a means of normalizing the constructed precarity of 
racialized workers in Canada. Historian Vic Satzewich (1988) points out that the 
Canadian state has always admitted “undesirable” non-Whites temporarily and overtly 
excluded those labeled as temporary from accessing full rights and labour protections 
(Rajkumar, Berkowitz, Vosko, Preston, and Latham, 2012). With migrant labour 
differentiated as a distinct tier in Canadian space, workers have been positioned by the 
state in particular, “hierarchically-organized ways” (Walia and Tagore, 2012: 75). As 
such, the state is able to create labour precarity by immobilizing workers within the 
                                                             
32 Moreover, according to indigenous scholar Andrea Smith: “For immigration to be a problem, people must 
live in a propertied relationship to land” (Smith, 2013, x). That is, land must be recognized and treated as a 
commodity that can be owned and manipulated by a particular group of people – in the case of Canada, 
White settlers (Smith, 2013). Smith argues that the freedom to migrate and indigenous sovereignty are 
necessarily connected, for: “Immigration is an Indigenous issue because settler-colonialism ultimately 
depends on an exclusivist concept of nation based on control and ownership of land and territory that is 
demarcated by borders” (Smith, 2013, xiii).   
33 Thobani points out that the institution of citizenship itself normalized Indigenous dispossession by 
allocating individual rights and land titles to settlers (Thobani, 2007).  
24 
 
national labour market and constricting access to resources, while also perpetually 
framing im/migrants as “problems to be managed and contained” (Walia and Tagore: 78).  
It is this particular framing that also guarantees the profitability of workers. As pointed 
out by Walia (2013: 70): 
The state denial of legal citizenship to these migrants ensures legal control 
over the disposability of the labourers, which in turn embeds the exploitability 
of their labour.   
Rather than simply blocking territorial access, Canadian border restriction measures 
have largely controlled how people are able to cross colonially-drawn borders and the 
kinds of entitlements and mobility they (do not) have once they have crossed (Sharma, 
2006; Robinson, 2006). Nandita Sharma (2006) describes migrants categorized as 
temporary as being strategically positioned by policymakers to exist outside of national 
space, despite living and working on national territory. Sharma (2001: 435) maintains 
that the state produces subjectivities through law and policy so that:   
The notion that some people just are citizens and Others just are not, even 
within the same borders, comes to be a normative stance. The fact that these 
[subjects] are realized through the social organization of human relations in a 
particularly exclusionary and exploitative way is concealed. 
 
Through the separate category of migrant worker, the state is able to facilitate the 
normalization of difference as well as reassert and maintain control over those groups it 
deems less desirable, eliminating temporary migrants from its master narrative of 
Canadian statehood.  
Until the 1960s and 70s, Canada’s declared racial identity – as well as legal 
citizenship – was boastfully White, consolidated through overtly White supremacist 
policies that charted access to status and land (Mawani, 2002). It is therefore unsurprising 
that when immigration policy began to be officially “deracialized” in 1962,34 im/migrants 
considered “coloured” were still impeded from settling in Canada, with state officials 
continuing to act as gatekeepers to “White man’s country” (Satzewich, 1988: 337). 
Rather than eliminating systemic racisms, discourses of national and cultural based 
difference came to replace those of biological inferiority (Thobani, 2007). This shift 
                                                             
34 Satzewich calls the establishment of migrant worker programs at the end of the 1960s a deliberate “re-
racialization” of Canadian immigration policy (Satzewich, 1988). 
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effectively worked to fortify racial hierarchies, “preserv[ing] racial discrimination within 
a legal framework where racially undesirable groups were no longer explicitly 
excluded”35 (Marsden, 2011: 46). 
Categorical separations in Canadian immigration law have strategically allowed 
for both the institutionalization and overshadowing of historical racisms, blocking access 
to basic protections and full status for the majority of racialized im/migrants who arrive 
in Canada while concealing this uneven access beneath “colourblind” neoliberal 
legislation (see Walia, 2013; Sharma, 2006; Thobani, 2007; Hanley, Choudry, Shragge, 
Henaway, & Stiegman, 2009; etc.). With racial categories obscured in dominant 
discourse, differential classification – rooted in colonial notions of difference – has 
become central to the contemporary workings of Canada’s immigration system.  
This has configured a system whereby distinct categories of people have profoundly 
unequal rights, while the racial contours – and racisms – of these categories are 
progressively buried beneath discourses of multiculturalism and White “tolerance” 
(Austin, 2013; Hanley, Choudry, Shragge, Henaway, & Stiegman, 2009). In Anderson’s 
words (2011): “Having created and codified ‘race’, modern liberal democracies now 
claim to move beyond it…” (Anderson, 2013, 41).  
The production and preservation of racial difference, however, continues to be 
central to the naturalization of differential immigration streams, the contemporary 
criminalization of im/migrants and the militarization of border controls in Canada – as 
well as the continued usurpation of Indigenous lands and resources (Anderson, 2013; 
Walia, 2010; Razack, 2002; Sharma, 2002, 2006, & 2009; Preibisch, 2007; Thobani, 
2001 & 2007). Because non-Whites are ultimately treated as “being outside of Canadian 
history,” the systemic discrimination and exclusion of racialized migrants is upheld in 
dominant discourse (Austin, 2013). Colonial narratives lay the foundation for who may 
be included in designs of the nation-state, creating criteria of belonging that inscribe the 
border categorically as well as territorially (Persaud, 2001; Mountz, 2010). 
                                                             
35 Various authors (Satzewich, 1989; Goldberg, 2001 & 2002; Thobani, 2007; Sharma, 2006; Kemp, 2004; 
etc) have pointed out that the institutionalization of race by the state – through state institutions, structures, 
laws, and national labour market – have allowed for modern states “to assert themselves racially without the 
explicit invocation of racial terms” (Goldberg, 2001, 248). 
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 Immigration regulations have always functioned to produce precarity and impose 
lawful dispossession onto particular – racialized – groups. Borders have consistently been 
used as a means to control the composition of the Canadian nation-state while facilitating 
settler access to “temporary,” contained labour. National mythologies actively shape the 
racial boundaries of the settler state, with categorical stratification and technologies of 
mobility control deeply racialized both across borders as well as national labour markets 
(McDowell and Wonders, 2009).  
 
White Supremacy and the Racialization of Labour 
Capitalist labour market hierarchies – organized through a world system of nationally-
defined labour markets – have long been segmented along racial lines, what scholar Leah 
Vosko calls the “racialized division of labour”. Randolph Persaud (2001: 379) describes 
such hierarchies as “direct descendants from racialized labour regimes, colonial practices, 
and practices of [colonial] sovereignty,” what Kelvin Santiago-Valles (2005) dubs “racial 
capitalism”. Persaud elaborates (2001: 389-390): 
The distinctive characteristic of slavery, indentureship, and quasi 
indentureship was that these labour regimes were configured around strictly 
controlled movement of the workers, coercion, and supremacist positions 
constructed around race… Both slave and indentured societies had strict laws 
governing movement. Elaborate legal systems were formulated to regulate the 
spatial characteristics of these societies… National sovereignty was inscribed 
by keeping out foreign power while simultaneously keeping in a substantial 
part of the labour population. 
 
The “fixing” of racial subjectivities in production relations has long been used as a means 
to contain labour by hierarchically positioning particular workers as subordinate outsiders 
to the nation-state (Anderson, 2013). Colonially-powered laws have worked to legitimize 
labour enclosure while also reasserting national sovereignty. The growth of temporary 
labour streams stems from this same effort of capitalist states to both accumulate capital 
and reinscribe sovereignty, facilitating a formal “culture of containment” through 
neoliberal legislation to in turn strengthen state power (Persaud, 2001; Choudry and 
Henaway, 2012).  
There are two main regulatory sites of racialization: the labour market and the 
border, with the former forging market-driven categories of hierarchically-organized 
27 
 
labour that are in turn administered and implemented by the latter (Kemp, 2004). The 
commodification of migrants fundamentally occurs through the simultaneous operation of 
border controls and labour production categories, with labour migration programs 
structured to create particular zones of confinement and flexibility. Colonial states 
continuously colour the material, spatial, and imaginary technologies of mobility control, 
with Whiteness given the “ability to move,” while blackness or colour are constructed as 
“static and immobilizing” (McDowell and Wonders, 2009). Workers are im/mobilized 
differentially through border controls and in national labour markets, positioned 
according to their racialized and gendered location in the colonial-capitalist world order 
(Bonacich and Wilson, 2008). 
National mythologies shape possibilities for labour mobility and status within 
Canada, reproducing colonial categories of difference that continue to drive migration 
management and the racialization of labour. Colonial states such as Canada have always 
relied on the labour of racialized “outsiders” – Indigenous peoples, im/migrants and 
slaves – to enable capital accumulation and preserve White supremacy. The state 
continuously configures those categories of people to be differentially exploited, 
manipulating race and categorical difference according to the needs of capital. As 
expressed by Pem Davidson Buck (2012: 106): “Race as we now know it was created by 
the emerging capitalist nation-state, and is still both foundational to and conversely 
maintained by capitalism and the modern capitalist state”. The capitalist project of 
labour-force creation has as such been brazenly articulated through nationalist projects of 
state formation (Brodkin, 1998). This has taken on particular dimensions for immigration 
control and migration management under neoliberal capitalist globalization.  
 
NEOLIBERAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 
Neoliberalism is the hegemonic mode of discourse and conceptual framework that drives 
the latest phase of global capitalism (Harvey 2007). An ideology characterized by strong 
individual property rights, the rule of law, and institutions for free markets and trade, 
neoliberalism has worked to deepen the historical injustices of colonialism, racism, and 
imperialism, exacerbating what geographer David Harvey calls accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey, 2004). According to Harvey, neoliberalism has become pervasive 
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and emphatically embedded in all social relations – “the common-sense way many of us 
interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 2007: 3; Peck & Tickell, 2002).  
Nation-states produce and preserve the institutional infrastructure necessary for 
neoliberalism, reconfiguring state designs and practices to promote privatization and new 
methods of amassing capital (Harvey, 2007; Martin, 2005). The inherent inequities of 
capital distribution and it’s need for constant expansion propels states to seek what 
Harvey calls a “spatial fix” to resolve capitalism’s internal contradictions, restructuring 
national space or else pursuing accumulation across borders. “Capital never solves its 
crisis tendencies, it merely moves them around” – defeated in locating new ways to grow, 
capital “searches for new spaces in which to grow” (Harvey, 2010: para. 26; Theodore 
and Peck, 2002: 465). State legislation and regulatory frameworks expedite the flow of 
capital, diffusing neoliberalism into everyday social and spatial relations to also broaden 
expressions of state power (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Harvey, 2007). The unprecedented rise 
of the neoliberal market has, as such, been “a politically managed and institutionally 
regulated process” to promote uneven geographical development (Peck, 2004: 399). 
States create space for flexible accumulation, forging new neoliberal landscapes that in 
turn transform the legal and administrative frameworks of the state in the interests of 
capital (Martin, 2005).  
This state-led process of neoliberal expansion is inherently racial, what Jeong-eun 
Rhee (2013) dubs “racial neoliberalism”. Racial neoliberalism develops and is sustained 
through the structural conditions of racism and colonialism, operating as a racial project 
in and through the state while simultaneously concealing the very racial categories that 
facilitate accumulation by dispossession. Like processes of state formation, neoliberalism 
intrinsically operates as a racialized process that produces and shapes “racial subjects,” 
influencing racial structures by inciting the creation, transformation, and elimination of 
particular categories. Processes of neoliberal racialization occur in relation to discursive 
practices, creating new and old racial hierarchies as meanings and workings of race shift 
in relation to capital (Rhee, 2013). This is necessarily tied to labour exploitation, as 
neoliberalism relies on the creation of a flexible – largely racialized – labour force to 
secure the accumulation of capital (Preibisch, 2007; McNally, 2006).  
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The management of immigration by the state is a key means of implementing 
racialized neoliberal governance. Seeking new ways to accumulate capital, states both 
generate and contain migrant workers through continuous forms of displacement and 
dispossession, a process that organizer Harsha Walia (2013) calls “border imperialism”. 
As state governance structures evolve to unceasingly meet the needs of capital, border 
imperialism both uproots workers and facilitates their containment in nationally-bound 
labour markets. State immigration policy, in particular, fortifies growing labour market 
segmentation on the basis of race and status by immobilizing workers through temporary 
labour categories, institutionalizing disposability and furthering the cycle of accumulation 
by dispossession that has pushed workers to migrate in the first place (Walia, 2013). 
William I. Robinson (2007) explains:  
The transnational circulation of capital and the disruption and 
deprivation it causes, in turn, generates the transnational circulation of 
labour. In other words, global capitalism creates immigrant workers… 
In a sense, this must be seen as a coerced or forced migration, since 
global capitalism exerts a structural violence over whole populations 
and makes it impossible for them to survive in their homeland (n.p. as 
citied in Shantz, 2010: 76).  
 
The freedom of capital is therefore necessarily “built on the unfreedom of the 
labouring majority” (McNally, 2006). While measures to facilitate the production of 
capital are carried out by state and extranational institutions, displacing and pushing 
workers into the labour market, labour and border mobility restrictions are increasingly 
tightened to contain labour, deepening labour divisions and legislating the “roll back” of 
rights (Peck and Tickell, 2002). As shifting forms of state governance become more 
neoliberalized, new means have emerged to discipline migratory flows and manage 
labour. This is particularly visible in the proliferation of migrant labour programs, which 
create the perfect “commodified and exploitable, flexible and expendable” workforce 
(Walia, 2010: 76). Such state-powered programs depend on drafting and restricting vast 
quantities of dislocated labour. As summed up by Walia (2013: 70):  
The violence enacted on those [migrant] bodies that have been displaced by 
imperialist and capitalist foreign and trade policy is further enabled through 
the deliberate making of migrant and undocumented workers as perpetually 




The Neoliberal Settler State 
In Canada, the settler state project has become articulated in important ways with 
neoliberalism. An intensification of state-backed resource extraction and the ongoing 
colonization of Indigenous lands, deepening labour market flexibilization, and the 
growing privatization of Canada’s immigration apparatus to for-profit contractors are just 
some examples of the kinds of exploitation that have been facilitated through neoliberal 
policies (Walia, 2010; Henaway, 2013). Stratified immigration controls have been 
important tools in furthering the racial injustices of colonial-capitalism, normalizing 
increasingly precarious working conditions and forging “the neoliberal worker” through 
differential categorization. While paths to refugee acceptance, permanent residency and 
family reunification programs have been progressively cut, temporary labour streams 
have been fast-tracked and are generally the only way for most migrants to legally reside 
in Canada. In this sense, the neoliberal worker is the migrant worker in Canada: nearly 1 
million undocumented and temporary workers hold up the base of the working subclass, 
largely stripped of labour protections and confined to precarious employment (Tal, 2015; 
Goldring, Berinstein, & Bernhard, 2009; CIC, 2012).  
The rapid growth of precarious, impermanent employment through the migrant 
worker category has been a racialized process. Despite living and working in Canada, 
migrant workers have “both discursively and legally [been] made into ‘foreign’ workers” 
by the state (Sharma, 2006: 76-77). The temporary worker category, solidified during the 
neoliberal restructuring of the 1970s, casts workers as “foreigners-within” Canada, 
differentiating labourers according to nationality to legitimize state-led labour 
flexibilization. Temporary labour precarity predominantly affects workers of colour, who 
constitute a disproportionate majority of migrant workers in Canada, particularly in the 
“low-skilled” stream (Preibisch, 2007; Lowe, 2007; Depatie-Pelletier, 2008). In crafting 
the category of “foreign” worker, the state has continually enabled a supply of low-cost – 
largely racialized – workers to Canadian employers, constructing a multi-tiered labour 
and immigration system while quietly eliminating paths to permanent status and stable 
employment. Sharma (2006) estimates that more than three-quarters of the workforce 
recruited to Canada from 1973 to 2004 arrived as migrant workers. This steady rise in 
temporariness has allowed for the normalization of new modes of precarious 
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employment, as temporary labour and temporary status become increasingly 
commonplace.  
The migrant worker category, meanwhile, is reproduced every day through state-
authorized labour recruitment and control mechanisms, particularly via what Kemp 
(2004) calls the binding system and deportability in Canada – i.e. labour containment. As 
bordering practices are devolved to private actors who facilitate the global hiring of 
workers, labour market processes have worked to depoliticize and conceal the role of the 
state in structuring and institutionalizing temporariness and tied employment. State policy 
binds “low-skilled” migrant workers to their employers “however exploitative, abusive, 
or positive that relationship may be” (Hennebry and Preibisch, 2010: 30). The binding 
system, according to Kemp, enforces a legislative framework in which migrants are 
regarded as “property-like” to employers, who, if unsatisfied, may “even ‘get 
compensated’ as if we were talking about a store returns policy” (Kemp, 2004: 275). At 
the same time, the state policy of deportation continues to position migrants as threats “to 
state sovereignty and law,” framing “foreign” workers as in constant need of regulation 
and containment for the supposed safety of Canadians (Kemp, 2004: 267). The state-
designed conditions of deportability and tied employment systematize worker precarity, 
creating the very possibility for super-exploitation while advancing a racialized hierarchy 
of labour in Canada (Walia, 2013). 
Relied on to “step into the work where the nation-state reaches its sovereign 
limits,” migration management institutions also reproduce the migrant worker category 
through processes of classification and categorization, effectively expanding the scope 
and scale of the state (Mountz and Ashtosh, 2011: 22). As more private actors become 
involved in implementing state policy (what Peck and Tickell call “roll-out” 
neoliberalism), migrants are increasingly categorized even before they reach a physical 
border. Alison Mountz and Ishan Ashutosh (2011) call these “new spaces of ‘networked 
governance’,” whereby states authorize private or intergovernmental organizations to 
manage and contain human mobility over vast geographies. The growing role of 
migration management groups in border enforcement and temporary labour recruitment 
points to a wider understanding of privatization as also a means of “expanding state 
capacities” (Mountz, Coddington, Catania, and Loyd, 2012: 536). Diffuse webs of 
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migration management open up new spaces and methods for ordering movement, 
multiplying the potential sites and scales for the management of migrant lives.  
 
Migration Management and the Ordering of Movement 
As border policies become more “managerialized” on a global scale, international 
agencies that specialize in producing regimes of border control have risen in number, 
expanding the “enhancement and deployment of state capacity” under neoliberalism 
(Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 980). The framing of state borders as “a problem of 
‘management’” has spurred the proliferation and networking of border expertise 
operations, establishing “an entire specialist domain” for “the design, policing, 
administration, and legal and technical operation of borders” (Andrijasevic and Walters, 
2010: 978). Agencies sort mobile populations into state-sanctioned categories, dividing 
migrants into “streams of useful and useless, admissible and returnable, employable and 
deportable” (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 982). Andrijasevic and Walters (2010: 982) 
describe this process as part of “neoliberalism as the new ethos of rule”: with border 
managerialization sold as a commodified service, private agencies increasingly spread the 
norms and mechanisms for bordering practices, dispersing methods of migration 
governance to also extend modes of state power. 
Migration management allows for a more effective control of “foreign” 
movement within national borders, spatially and temporally extending migration control 
mechanisms beyond physical frontiers. The IOM, a trailblazer in border management 36 
services, defines migration management as a “system for the orderly and humane 
management for cross-border migration,” specifically “managing the entry and presence 
of foreigners within the borders of the state” (IOM, 2014, para. 24). While the 
humanitarian language of migration management distracts from the deliberate way that 
precarity is created through multi-tiered categories and profit-seeking brokers, “migration 
management” has come to be a synonym for what Hennebry (2012) calls “permanent 
temporariness”: rather than facilitate settlement and full status, management mechanisms 
permanently regulate and restrict temporary “foreigners” within nationally-bound labour 
                                                             
36 The IOM defines border management as: “Facilitation of authorized flows of persons, including business 
people, tourists, migrants and refugees, across a border and the detection and prevention of irregular entry 
of non-nationals into a given country” (IOM, 2015, para. 4).  
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markets. The unprecedented increase of temporary migrant workers in Canada, for 
example, is directly rooted in the state’s adoption of a migration management framework 
that favors impermanence over access to citizenship.  
With immigration policy increasingly used as a means to source, contain, and 
remove “undesirable” migrants according to fluctuations in the national labour market, 
the Canadian state has eased the outsourcing of many migration-related services both in 
Canada and transnationally37. Private labour recruitment agencies, in particular, are 
essential intermediaries in migrant worker programs, controlling access to Canada’s 
labour market and carrying out migration management across borders as prescribed by 
the Canadian state and Canadian employers. Agencies are decisive actors in enforcing 
labour disposability, locating low-cost workers and also guaranteeing their removal from 
Canada for a profit. The precarious makeup of labour migration programs is typically 
compounded by recruitment intermediaries, who reportedly are responsible for an array 
of abuses – from general corruption, fraud and exorbitant fees, to misinformation and 
false promises – as well as a re-institutionalization of explicitly discriminatory hiring 
practices in worker selection (Faraday, 2011 & 2014; Choudry and Henaway, 2012; 
Preibisch, 2010).  
While Canadian employers are technically prevented from using prejudiced 
practices in hiring Canadian workers, the organizations that hire migrant workers have 
systematized such practices into their work (Preibisch, 2010). With employers free to 
express any labour preference and hire from any region worldwide, racialized notions of 
productivity and docility configure labour management. As reiterated by Marta 
Maldonado (2009), racialized discourses and representations of particular kinds of 
workers have “furnished the ideological underpinning for guest worker and labour 
recruitment programs” (Maldonado, 2009: 1018). Recruitment agencies seek out those 
workers who may fit into the migrant worker category as established by Canadian 
institutions, hiring workers according to their nationality, race, gender, and physical 
attributes (Preibisch, 2010). Agencies reproduce the migrant worker category through the 
                                                             
37 The IOM assisted Canada in carrying out its “Volunteer Departure Program” for refugees, spending over 
$7.5 million since 2012 paying would-be refugees to leave the country (NOII, 2014; IOM, 2015). The number 
of overall deportations from Canada, moreover, has increased dramatically over the last few years, with over 
49 deportations carried out each day in 2014 (CIC, 2012; CBSA, 2014). 
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tangible selection of temporary workers and enforcement of temporary bordering 
practices. Accordingly, the daily interactions of recruitment representatives can serve as a 
“mechanism through which racist ideologies become institutionalized and visible” 
(Maldonado, 2009, 1033).  
While many scholars have documented the rapid growth of temporary 
employment in Canada and the labour abuses that these temporary structures perpetuate 
(see Hennebry, 2012; Galvez, 2011; Cragg, 2011; Depatie-Pelletier, 2007 & 2011; 
Faraday, 2012; Fudge, 2011; Fudge & MacPhail, 2009; Goldring & Landolt, 2013; 
Nakache, 2010; Roberge, 2011; Preibisch 2007 & 2010; Satzewich, 1991; etc.), very little 
attention has been paid to the growing role of private and intergovernmental actors that 
implement Canadian immigration policy and act on behalf of Canadian employers, 
selecting and transferring migrant workers to Canada (See Faraday, 2014, for 
exceptions). Moreover, there has been little research on the devolved infrastructure of 
migrant worker programs under expanding border management policies and how this 
may contribute to the structural precarity of temporary labour, as well as what this might 
look like beyond national borders. Finally and perhaps most importantly, research 
conducted on Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program generally lacks an anti-
colonial analysis that contextualizes current relations of labour exploitation within the 
broader colonialisms that have wrought the contours of mobility and containment. 
In this context, my project seeks to uncover the ideologies and practices that 
naturalize differential classification in Canada’s TFWP and trace how changing 
neoliberal processes – rooted in the structures of the racial settler state – heighten 
racialized hierarchies and perpetuate colonial violences across transnational landscapes. 
By unmapping and making visible the discourses and actors involved in the elaborate 
processes of classifying and rejecting identities in the case of the TFWP, I describe how 
borders are spatially and socially organized through shifting processes of categorization 
and containment. To challenge hegemonic discourses, it is important to locate “the 
everyday geographies of the nation-state” and undo the conceptual lines that make the 
neoliberal state an abstract entity (Mountz, 2010). As states devolve and privatize under 
“roll-out” neoliberalism, private agencies have become significant players in the 
realization of Canadian immigration policy. Through an examination of agency narratives 
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and practices in the Canada-Guatemala project, I aspire to unsettle the continual 




Chapter 4: POSITIONING AND APPROACH 
 The problem is not that of taking power, but rather who exercises it.  
– Subcomandante Marcos 
 
This research is part of a larger personal process of seeking to understand the profound 
injustices that structure the freedom to move, to stay and to return, and is a means to 
reflect on my own privilege within the lines that configure mobility and movement. My 
ancestors are Anglophone settlers who over many centuries have displaced and colonized 
Mohawk and Abenaki peoples, and I in grew up in a Québécois agricultural community 
that each spring is increasingly populated with Guatemalan migrant workers. I have spent 
much of my adulthood moving freely in Canada and Latin America, and since arriving in 
Montréal have been heavily engaged in the migrant justice movement by supporting 
people who face the very barriers/borders that I freely am able to traverse. I recognize the 
immense privileges that I hold as a White settler with a Canadian passport, and believe 
that these privileges need to be transparent as I write, research, and act in solidarity with 
others.   
While I see this project as a means of understanding one component of the 
colonial-capitalist immigration apparatus, I recognize that the research process itself – as 
well as my position within it – can be a reproduction of the very oppressions I am 
attempting to deconstruct and challenge. Academic research is rooted in colonial 
structures and methods that reproduce categories, hierarchies, and power relations 
mirroring those of Canada’s immigration system and nation-state (Lander, 2000). As 
expressed by Indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith, “The term research is 
inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism…Research provides the 
foundations for reports about and representations of the other” (Denzin, Lincoln, & 
Tuhiwai Smith et al., 2008, 4). Being a White settler welcomed in “research culture” and 
the university, the fact that I am not directly affected by the violence of the borders I 
critique is an important part of my own positionality – for, while we are all deeply 
enmeshed in colonial relations of power, it is the “expert,” the researcher, who ultimately 
has the last word in retelling these stories.  
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My own mobility and status as a White Canadian has benefitted me in being able 
to carry out this research, giving me access to movement, resources, and particular, 
mostly elite, circles in Guatemala. As a White Canadian, gaining access to institutional 
networks in Guatemala City and the surrounding areas was a relatively simple process 
due to my privileged position as an academic outsider. Moreover, my impeccable timing 
in Guatemala City – arriving shortly after the dissolution of the IOM-Guatemala – 
contributed to being able to access agencies and interview recruiters. Having previously 
built relationships with activists, migrant workers, and academics from Guatemala, I was 
also able to connect to wider networks of support and make new connections through 
introductions and personal networks. In particular, a dedicated organizer, friend, and 
former migrant worker supported me extensively by introducing me to his former co-
workers, neighbours, and comrades who have had intimate experiences with recruitment 
and work in Canada. Labour rights organizers at FLACSO and the Association of 
Guatemalans United for Our Rights (AGUND) were also very supportive. Meanwhile, 
securing interviews with agency representatives in Canada was a much more difficult – 
and ultimately less fruitful – process.  
Although I began this project with the hope that information collected might 
somehow contribute to the struggle for migrant justice, I recognize that the format and 
language of this document are inaccessible to most and so it is unlikely that this thesis 
will do that. Moreover, while I believe that the research process should in every way 
possible support the self-determination of those who are directly facing unjust 
immigration and labour policies, fulfilling this has proven to be difficult in practice given 
the individualist and short-term nature of this project, particularly within competitive-
driven university structures that emphasize the publishing of property over the practice of 
building relationships. Still, I hope that sharing this research might be a way to shed light 
on how Canadian migrant worker programs have reverberating consequences far beyond 
small agricultural communities such as mine, and might be a way to destabilize the unjust 
categories and racisms that have become commonplace in my childhood landscape and 
across rural Canada.   
Finally, I am writing this document in the spirit of what geographers Jenna Loyd, 
Matt Mitchelson and Andrew Burridge (2012) call a “no-borders politics”: 
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A no-borders politics opposes and seeks to dismantle the complex array of 
public and private companies, organizations, and agencies involved in 
controlling the mobility of people between and within the nation-state. No-
borders politics is committed to creating places where people can reside 
without displacement and to being able to move freely (Loyd, Mitchelson and 
Burridge, 2012, 11).  
 
While the recruitment industry is just one component of Canada’s neoliberal immigration 
system, its actors are important gatekeepers in governing and restricting the mobility of 
those who have been displaced. In deciphering and making visible the narratives and 
workings of the recruitment process, I hope to contribute to disentangling the elaborate 
web of the TFWP, exposing and denaturalizing the containment of movement towards a 
wider politics for imagining a world without borders, in support of the freedom of all to 
move, to stay, and to return.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Critical border studies scholars conceptualize the border as “a series of practices” rather 
than as a mere line between states. Constructed in the interests of the (colonial) nation-
state, borders are constantly being produced and maintained, changing shape under 
neoliberalism to become increasingly multidimensional, mobile, and expanding (Parker, 
Vaughan-Williams et al., 2009; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; Razack, 2002; Mountz and 
Ashutosh, 2012). Parker, Vaughan-Williams et al. (2009) describe bordering practices as 
“actor-oriented,” highlighting the agents and actions that underlie the continuous spatial 
and temporal production of borders. Under neoliberal migration management, borders act 
as filters and sites of differentiation, with multiple actors, practices and structures 
contributing to what Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) call “the govern-
mentalization of the border”. Language, imagery, and performance are important 
components of border management, as borders are continuously enacted and changing 
through everyday actions and geographical imaginaries (Braiden, 2014). 
 The sites where bordering practices occur are important spaces for the re-
production of the nation-state. Geographer Alison Mountz (2003) describes the state as 
constituted of a series of institutional, spatialized bordering practices, involving diverse 
actors that see, classify, and reject individuals through daily bureaucratic arrangements. 
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Bordering actors manage and produce difference through classification and 
categorization, implementing everyday nation-building exercises to determine who 
(temporarily) belongs within or outside of the nation. According to Mountz, the nation-
state becomes articulated through the imaginations – and narratives – of those who enact 
it. It is therefore important to locate the “everyday geographies of the nation-state” as a 
means to deconstruct dominant discourses, challenge binaries between state and non-state 
actors, and undo the conceptual lines that typically make the state an abstract entity. In 
examining processes of differential classification in the everyday, it becomes possible to 
unmap the material webs and narratives that normalize state violence (Mountz, 2003). 
 Bordering methods, sites, and processes are increasingly dynamic and manifold. 
Carried out by both state and non-state actors, bordering activities range in practice from 
fashioning state policy to containing and processing im/migrants in administrative, 
detention and deportation facilities, carrying out targeted recruitment, granting temporary 
entry, issuing and implementing removal orders, etc. Borders are temporal as well as 
territorial, calculated not merely to prevent border crossings but to control how borders 
are crossed (Sharma, 2006; Robinson, 2006). This is necessarily tied to labour control. 
As expressed by Mezzadra and Neilson: “The border between the commodity form of 
labour power and its ‘container’ must continuously be reaffirmed and retraced” 
(Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 19). As such, processes of border-making are often not 
necessarily visible or overt. Rather, as bordering practices extend transnationally and take 
up new forms and spaces under neoliberalism, they also work to transform performances 
of state sovereignty and expressions of im/mobility, becoming dispersed through the 
labyrinthine institutions and mechanisms of the migration process. Spaces of networked 
migration management extend globally, creating new nodes – and markets – for 
neoliberal governance: filters, classifications, passage points, etc. (Mountz and Ashutosh, 
2012; Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). As more temporary migration streams are 
introduced by the nation-state, new (transnational) actors are required to perform the 
social, spatial, temporal, and juridical-legal practices that order and classify migrants. 
Canada’s Low-Skill Pilot Program (of the TFWP) is an example of one such 
stream. State-powered and employer-driven, there is no specific government body to 
oversee the TFWP, and so its’ governance has been scattered between a multitude of state 
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and non-state actors, without any particular process for accountability and/or 
transparency. While there are many different organizations and individuals involved in 
obtaining and transferring workers from Guatemala to Canada38, the main actors engaged 
in bordering practices – that is, those who sort, classify, and send temporary workers to 
Canada – are private recruitment organizations. Agencies participate in discursively 
producing differential categories – and, in turn, subjectivities – of workers by cataloguing 
candidates according to explicitly ableist, gendered, racialized, moral, and temporal 
requirements set out by Canadian institutions. Employing particular narratives to filter 
and order workers who wish to work in Canada, they also participate in creating new 
standards and ideas of border and labour expertise. This thesis will interrogate the 
bordering practices and narratives carried out by recruitment agencies in Canada’s TFWP 
in Guatemala.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Institutional linkages make up a complex network of management and control that 
scholar Dorothy E. Smith calls “relations of ruling” (Smith, 1999). According to Smith, 
the organizational activities that shape such “ruling relations” occurs in and across 
multiple sites and involves the actions of individuals who typically are unknown to one 
another and so do not meet directly (DeVault & McCoy, 2006). Smith traces the 
empirical linkages within processes of bureaucracy and governance “to explore particular 
corners or strands within a specific institutional complex, in ways that make visible their 
points of connection with other sites and courses of action” (DeVault & McCoy, 2006: 
17). I use Smith’s “relations of ruling” approach to examine recruitment operations as 
one aspect of the broader TFWP, investigating the various actors, sites, and mechanisms 
that together implement worker recruitment. I do so by examining the everyday 
geographies of migrant worker selection, conducting qualitative, open-ended interviews 
with a range of recruitment actors in the LSPP in Guatemala and Canada and charting the 
                                                             
38 Such as Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), Citizenship and Immigration Canada 




various steps that workers must undertake in order to be considered for a temporary 
labour contract.   
I have chosen to focus on recruitment due to its’ relative invisibility within the 
Canadian immigration complex to residents in Canada. A component of the TFWP that is 
largely concealed by its transnational, serpentine structure, I argue that recruitment acts 
as an important bordering practice in itself, particularly in constituting the ongoing 
borders that migrant workers face on a daily basis once in Canada. The tangled, web-like 
structures that comprise TFWP recruitment and management produces spaces for 
miscommunication, fraud, and profit, consuming workers within illegible, mazelike 
processes while projecting the image of a lawful, ordered Canada. Through an 
interrogation of the day-to-day agency activities that forge “good workers” and the 
imaginary parameters of temporary labour in Canada, I aim to denaturalize how the 
TFWP – and the ideologies which uphold it – is actively constructed in the everyday 
through worker recruitment. I describe how Canadian border management practices are 
realized through the continuous classification and containment of workers both in 
Guatemala and Canada. Recruitment practices also importantly contribute to maintaining 
dominant settler mythologies of who may reside (temporarily) within Canada, 
reinscribing colonial notions of inclusion/exclusion. In exposing and unmapping the 
particular narratives (and “truths”) which maintain daily recruitment operations and shape 
the selection of workers, I aim to uncover the racial, spatial, and colonial articulations of 
TFWP bordering practices.  
I interrogate the bordering narratives of TFWP recruitment actors using narrative 
methodology and discourse analysis. Narratives have been defined as “indexes of power” 
which “make sense of experience” and “construct meaning” (Cameron, 2012; Prokkola, 
2014). Complex, layered, and often multi-dimensional, narratives are a means to 
investigate everyday situations and sites where discourses are negotiated, a concept in 
and through which actual practices materialize (Prokkola, 2014). Narratives work to 
diffuse, communicate, and construct knowledge, relations, and power structures, and are 
often sites of struggle and contradiction. In geographer Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola’s words: 
“Narrative plotting and practices can be understood as political actions in which 
particular social and cultural discourses are confirmed and others contested” (Prokkola, 
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2014: 445). Discourses, in turn, are the framework within which narratives are situated, 
often described as a set of ideas that structure knowledge and practice to impart meaning 
to narratives, concepts, texts, etc. (Berg, 2009). Subjects both contribute to discourses and 
are positioned by them. Discourse analysis, therefore, works to unearth how particular 
discourses and arrangements have come to be normalized through language. By 
identifying the dominant narratives and inconsistencies of TFWP actors, it is possible to 
uncover and challenge the bordering configurations that maintain temporary migration 
structures and colonially-imposed categories.  
 
METHODS  
In early January 2014, I arrived in Guatemala City to begin my fieldwork at the Faculty 
for Latin American Social Sciences (FLACSO) with the support of their academic 
personnel. After just a few days in Guatemala, I learned that the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) – the intergovernmental body that had co-instituted the 
Guatemala-Canada Pilot Project – had been expelled from the country for corruption 
charges and abandoned their offices just a few months before. All that remained of the 
IOM was a post office box. With the organization’s departure, five new worker 
recruitment agencies had surfaced between June and December of 201339, many of them 
composed of past IOM staff, to compete with two other migration management agencies 
that had been operating since 2009 and 2010, respectively. The practices and narratives of 
these institutions became my research focus during the four months that I conducted 
fieldwork in Guatemala. 
Contacting agencies was a relatively simple process: after a few weeks at 
FLACSO, I visited Movilidad Laboral, an office of the Guatemalan Ministry of Labour 
dedicated to supporting international migration to Mexico, the US, and Canada. At the 
Movilidad office, I was given contact information for the seven agencies that had been 
organizing to send Guatemalan workers to Canada. In the following months, from 
February to April 2014, I carried out twelve open-ended, qualitative interviews with the 
                                                             
39 New agencies included: one in Santa Rosa (ACADECGUA), another in Amatitlán (Human Out), and three 
more in Guatemala City (Canadian Job, Comuguate, and AIM). 
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staff of all seven recruitment agencies active at that time in Guatemala, and one in 
Montreal, speaking with a total of eighteen recruitment representatives from eight 
agencies (See table 1 for overview and appendix 7 for agency interview questions). I was 
also able to interview nine former IOM staff as many of them were employed in new 
agencies. In these interviews, I asked agency staff about the formation of labour 
recruitment organizations, the operational workings of the TFWP and the various 
processes agencies carry out in worker classification and selection40. During interviews I 
was also able to occasionally observe trainings, informational sessions, and worker 
interviews, as well as see recruitment sites, which ranged from small offices to parcels of 
land and entire operational farms used to evaluate and train workers.  
 
TABLE 1. AGENCY INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT IN 2014 
Agency Number of 
interviews 
Interview structure Number of 
total staff 
interviewed 
A 2 Group, open-ended 2 
B 1 Group, open-ended 3 
C 1 One-on-one, open-ended 1 
D 1 Group, open-ended 3 
E 2 One-on-one, open-ended 2 
F 2 Group and one-on-one, open-
ended 
3 
G 2 One-on-one, open-ended 3 
H 1 One-on-one, open-ended 1 
TOTAL 12 5 group, 7 one-on-one 18 
 
During fieldwork, I also collected archives, publications, statistics, and surveys 
from FLACSO, San Carlos University, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labour, the Consejo 
Nacional de Atención al Migrante de Guatemala (CONAMIGUA), and the National 
Statistics Institute of Guatemala (INE), as well as obtained documents from the agencies I 
interviewed. While I was able to collect general information from these groups, most 
knowledge about actual recruitment practices and agency structures for labour migration 
to Canada could only be learned by word of mouth through interviews with agencies and 
workers. While there is some information on the general number of Guatemalans who go 
to Canada each year and their department of origin, little has been recorded regarding 
                                                             
40 See appendix vi for open interview guideline with agencies.  
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TFWP recruitment in Guatemala beyond that.41 Moreover, there is no written 
documentation on the details of the recruitment process to Canada.   
While I had not planned on interviewing workers due to my positioning as a 
White academic, a friendship with an activist who is a former migrant worker pushed me 
to meet various workers who agreed to be interviewed anonymously. While visiting this 
friend in the province of Santa Rosa, I met a household of workers in a mountainous 
village near an old plantation – an area that was once a hot recruiting spot – who in turn 
introduced me to other workers in surrounding communities. I was also introduced to 
workers through friends in and around Guatemala City, who shared conversations in 
brightly-lit shopping malls and crowded plazas during my first few weeks of fieldwork. 
And, at the end of February, I embarked on a whirlwind road trip with a Guatemalan 
academic to visit workers from different communities in the departments of 
Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, San Marcos, Escuintla, and Santa Rosa. In total, I carried 
out nineteen interviews with thirty-nine workers across various departments: Guatemala 
(5), San Marcos (3), Santa Rosa (15), Escuintla (3), Chimaltenango (5), el Progreso (3), 
and Sacatepéquez (5); from a total of approximately 18 different communities (See table 
3 for overview and appendix 8 for worker interview questions). All interviews consisted 
of open-ended questions about the recruitment and selection process; 42 twelve were one-
on-one and seven were group sessions with between two and twelve participants. These 
interviews proved to be critical in countering the narratives of for-profit agencies.  
 
TABLE 2. LIST OF WORKER INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT IN 2014 
Interview Structure & number of 
workers 
Location Department of 
origin 
Date 
1 Group of 3, open-ended Guatemala City Guatemala January 2014 
2 One-on-one, open-ended Guatemala City Santa Rosa January 2014 
3 Group of 2, open-ended Santa Rosa Santa Rosa January 2014 
4 One-on-one, open-ended Santa Rosa Santa Rosa January 2014 
5 One-on-one, open-ended Sacatepéquez Sacatepéquez January 2014 
6 One-on-one, open-ended Guatemala City San Marcos February 2014 
7 One-on-one, open-ended Guatemala City Guatemala February 2014 
8 One-on-one, open-ended Sacatepéquez Chimaltenango February 2014 
9 Group of 3, open-ended Sacatepéquez Sacatepéquez February 2014 
10 Group of 5, open-ended Chimaltenango Chimaltenango February 2014 
11 Group of 2, open-ended San Marcos San Marcos February 2014 
12 One-on-one, open-ended San Marcos San Marcos February 2014 
13 Group of 3, open-ended Escuintla Escuintla February 2014 
                                                             
41 As well as two IOM “project evaluation” reports, written in 2006 and 2008, respectively.  
42 See appendix vii for worker interview guides.  
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14 Group of 12, open-ended Santa Rosa Santa Rosa March 2014 
15 One-on-one, open-ended Santa Rosa Santa Rosa March 2014 
16 One-on-one, open-ended Santa Rosa Santa Rosa March 2014 
17 One-on-one, open-ended Guatemala City El Progreso March 2014 
18 One-on-one, open-ended Victoriaville, QC El Progreso April 2014 
19 One-on-one, open-ended Victoriaville, QC El Progreso April 2014 
TOTAL 7 group, 12 one-on-one N/A N/A N/A 
 
FIGURE 3. MAP OF GUATEMALA 
 
(Kairos Canada, 2015) 
 
 
Of the thirty-nine workers interviewed, thirty-six had worked in Canada and three 
were targets of fraud (never having worked in Canada); four identified as women and 
thirty-five as men, and all were approximately between the age of 22 and 40. Thirty-four 
out of thirty-nine workers went into debt in order to afford recruitment fees. There is 
evidence that workers made individual payments ranging between 2000Q (325$) and 
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80,000Q ($12,735CAD) (without necessarily going to Canada);43 and most (twenty-one) 
did not know if they were returning to work in Canada or not. All agencies interviewed, 
meanwhile, claimed to have at least one contract or Canadian counterpart in Canada, with 
the exception of one agency that had its visa applications rejected for working with a 
blacklisted employer and had not yet been able to obtain an additional contract or 
Canadian representative (See table 2). Due to the labyrinthine and employer-driven 
structure of the TFWP, almost all agencies (six out of eight, as well as the IOM) had at 
some point or another worked with a blacklisted Canadian employer44 and six had been 
accused of fraud by workers while also contributing to worker blacklisting, i.e. banning 
workers from Canada (see chapter 6 for more information)45. Overall, I was surprised 
how widespread rumours of well-paid work in Canada were, and how workers and 
agencies came from all parts of the country rather than just a particular department. 
 




                                                             
43 Records from the Governance Ministry of Guatemala (Ministerio de Gobernación) show charges of 
8,000Q, 10,000Q, 13,500Q, 18,000Q, 20,000Q, 30,000Q, 35,000Q, 40,000Q, 55,000Q, 60,000Q, 70,000Q, 
and 80,000Q etc., however, this is just a small fraction of total charges, as most individuals who have paid 
money to go to Canada have not begun legal proceedings against agencies that have scammed them 
(CONAMIGUA, 2014).  
44 Although there are a few Canadian companies that have been formally blacklisted by Canadian and 
Guatemalan governments for the labour abuses, this list is not public nor actively monitored and, as such, 
even blacklisted companies have succeeded in continuously obtaining migrant workers. If an employer 
becomes blacklisted by the Guatemalan government they can easily just switch source countries. 
45 For the purpose of protecting the identities of those interviewed, the names of agencies are not shared in 
this article. 














FIGURE 5. RACIAL IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEWED WORKERS 
   
 
In Guatemala, four out of the seven total agencies were composed of former IOM 
staff, while the remaining three were predominantly made up of former agricultural 
workers and/or entrepreneurs. The four agencies run by past IOM employees were all 
based out of offices in Guatemala City and at the time were sending the majority of 
migrant workers to Canada, with one particular agency handling the greatest number of 
workers since its inception in 2010 due to its close ties with FERME and the remaining 
groups emerging and competing for contracts since the closure of the IOM in 2013. The 
agency staff members of these groups were largely university-educated, upper class 
individuals of Guatemalan nationality, but also included a Canadian and a German, the 
latter of whom ran the largest functioning agency, and the organizations ranged in size 
from having three to seventeen employees. A single agency not affiliated with the IOM in 
Guatemala City, however, was owned and operated by a university-educated entrepreneur 
in partnership with a former migrant worker, employed nine staff, and had not yet sent 
any workers to Canada – due to applications being rejected – despite recruiting workers 
in agriculture since 2013 with the hope of also expanding to nursing46.  
Agencies in Chimaltenango and Santa Rosa, meanwhile, had been operating as 
organizations since 2009 and 2013, respectively, and were mainly administered by former 
                                                             
46 Through Canada’s Caregiver Program (formally known as the Live-In Caregiver Program).  









farmers from these areas, in conjunction with a Canadian agency based in Montreal that I 
also interviewed. Although only employing between five and seven staff, most of whom 
had studied a profession or agricultural specialty at a collegial level but not attended 
university, these groups functioned as member-based organizations and so included 
between 400 and 275,000 members across twenty-two departments all over Guatemala 
who were required to pay a fee and manually contribute to the organization. All three 
non-IOM affiliated agencies (in Guatemala City, Chimaltenango, and Santa Rosa) held 
offices in their regional capital while also requiring candidates to complete a certain 
number of training hours on their agricultural terrain in a rural area, and typically sold 
various add-ons ranging from manual labour and agronomy trainings to language classes, 
lie-detector tests, uniforms, etc. In total, three out of seven agencies in Guatemala ran 
additional “development” projects alongside recruitment – such as an employment 
reintegration project for returned migrants and agricultural development programs – 
while the remainder specialized only in securing and processing workers for Canada’s 
TFWP. However, the majority (six out of seven) aspired to eventually create 
development projects of their own.  
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As a White woman from Canada carrying out interviews in Spanish primarily 
with high-ranking businessmen and male workers, many of whom were racialized, there 
were particular gendered, raced, and classed power dynamics at play throughout my work 
as a researcher. I found that, being a White Canadian, I had a particular advantage in 
agencies wanting to speak with me as they saw a possibility of a contract or further 
contact with Canadian businesses. While I tried to be clear about my position as a 
researcher and not a broker, I am certain that my identity helped provoke recruiters to 
speak with me. Moreover, as there had been a recent shift in the recruitment landscape, 
with many fragmented groups rather than a single entity or two rivals that had 
characterized the institutional landscape until the end of 2013, various groups wished to 
“set the story straight” and have their narrative told to contrast that of their competitors; 
this also worked to my advantage.  
Power dynamics with workers, meanwhile, were a different sort altogether and in 
some ways much more pronounced. Many rumours circulated about workers’ fear of 
speaking out and the reasons for this, from the idea of paid informants to nearby agencies 
watching over workers’ actions. As an outsider in Guatemala, it was not clear to me 
whether there could in fact be material consequences if a worker chose to speak with me; 
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however, in comparison to interviewing workers in Canada, I was told that being invited 
to a community was much safer, considering that employers were thousands of 
kilometres away and high profile recruiters mostly confined to the capital city. All the 
workers that I spoke with were introduced to me through trusted personal networks. I 
therefore also felt a much stronger obligation to follow-up with workers and be 
accountable to them, especially due to the precarious position of individuals who had 
either been physically or verbally abused in Canada, charged exorbitant amounts of 
money that had serious repercussions for themselves and their families, and/or were 
unable to return to Canada due to blacklisting despite never having received 
compensation. As much of the organizing I do in Montreal aims to support migrants, I 
found it impossible to separate support for workers who were willing to share their stories 
with me from the research I was conducting. What proved more difficult, however, was 
continuing this support over the long term, particularly after I returned to Canada – 
which, for me personally, has led to larger questions around solidarity work and 
accountability.  
Upon returning to Montreal in April, I attempted to contact the Canadian 
counterparts of the groups I had interviewed in Guatemala, as well as Canadian 
employers through personal networks in the Eastern Townships. All in all, it was much 
more difficult to make contact with Canadian-based agencies and employers. This was 
most likely due to the way that the TFWP has been more publicly criticized in Canada, 
and so employer associations are much more guarded against media coverage, as well as 
my own scarcity of resources and the dispersed geographies of agencies spanning across 
Canada. From April to May, after many e-mails, phone calls, and even office visits, only 
one agency in Canada consented to an interview – and this group, in particular, was one 
that had only succeeded in sending one group of workers to an employer blacklisted by 
the Guatemalan Ministry of Labour, but had acted as a counterpart to two rural-based 
agencies in Guatemala. Out of four Canadian employers approached for an interview 
through contacts in my home community, none agreed to an interview. Through personal 
networks in Canada, however, I ended up conducting two final interviews with 
Guatemalan workers who had been recruited through intermediaries of an agency and 
charged thousands of dollars in recruitment fees.  
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Altogether, the bulk of this thesis is comprised of the stories told to me by 
recruitment representatives from nine recruitment agencies (the IOM, seven active groups 
in Guatemala, and one in Canada) and thirty-nine Guatemalan workers introduced to me 
through personal networks. While this thesis is chiefly an examination of recruitment 
agency operations, I also incorporate worker narratives and experiences as a way to 
ground the winding discourses that agency representatives weave. This includes the story 
of Ana47, a narrative crafted from interview excerpts with a single mother who has tried 
to go to Canada on three separate occasions, included to illustrate the magnitude of labour 
migration fraud in Guatemala. While I have tried my best to be true to the stories relayed 
to me, I recognize that my own voice is the perspective that necessarily frames and 
guides their narratives. Still, I hope that these stories, unmapped, may provide a counter-
narrative to the entrenched myths that typically underpin Temporary Foreign Worker 














                                                             
47 Not her real name.  
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Chapter 5: SITUATING BORDERING INSTITUTIONS 
Recruiters are intermediaries who control access to Canadian employers, navigating the 
complex paperwork and processes necessary for workers to temporarily migrate to 
Canada. They are both legally sanctioned and structurally necessary: it is virtually 
impossible for workers to apply to the low-skilled agricultural stream without agency 
support, as an offer of employment from a Canadian employer is needed in order to 
obtain a valid work permit and visa, and workers must fulfill Canadian immigration 
requirements that are accessible only in English or French. Information regarding the 
TFWP is largely confined to government websites, available only to those with the 
resources and language skills to access them, allowing agencies to specialize as the 
“experts” in Canada’s temporary labour industry. To qualify for the TFWP, workers must 
prove agricultural experience and so typically come from removed agricultural areas, and 
must have equivalent or less than a sixth grade education – as such, workers are often 
Indigenous, speak Spanish as a second language and have no knowledge of French or 
English. This structure creates a situation whereby workers are forced to rely on agencies 
in order to access temporary employment in Canada.  Without any transparent standards 
or instructions on TFWP costs or process – and with program prerequisites varying 
widely depending on employer specifications and agency practices – recruiters are thus 
generally free to do and charge what they wish. Unsurprisingly, fraud and misinformation 
are widespread, and many organizations demand payments simply for taking workers’ 
names.  
Since the inception of the Pilot Project in 2003, the role of recruitment agents has 
been to secure labour that will meet the needs of Canadian employers and abide by 
Canadian immigration regulations. As such, they have represented Canadian and private 
interests. This has been clear from the onset of the Canada-Guatemala project and has 
intensified as the program’s devolved architecture has moved beyond the Business 
Foundation for the Recruitment of Agricultural Workers (FERME) and the IOM to 
encompass a wide variety of private, for-profit, employer-driven recruitment 
organizations. Recruitment has also been described by agencies, employers and the 
Canadian and Guatemalan states alike as a way of promoting “development” in 
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Guatemala, managing “lawful,” “riskless” movement for the benefit of communities. 
Many workers and labour rights organizations, meanwhile, have characterized 
recruitment as a mere means to capitalize on and deepen already precarious labour 
conditions. All in all, various conflicting yet connected narratives have upheld the 
parameters of labour recruitment in Guatemala and Canada, varying from employer to 
worker and recruiter, on-the-ground communities, the state, and overlapping 
subjectivities in-between.   
This chapter aims to situate recruitment agency practices by examining the 
narratives used in the founding and expansion of temporary labour recruitment groups in 
Guatemala and Canada. Institutional narratives underpin everyday recruitment processes, 
arranging for the enlisting and processing of workers and shaping possibilities for capital 
accumulation. Broadly speaking, agencies employ three main narratives in carrying out 
recruitment: 1) temporary labour as a business for Canada, 2) temporary labour as 
humanitarian aid for Guatemala, 3) temporary labour as lawful – and therefore “good” – 
movement. In this chapter, I will retrace and examine these narratives as told by agencies 
as well as incorporate the perspectives and lived experiences of Guatemalan migrant 
workers.  
 
The TFWP: A business for Canada 
“An open scheme for all the world,” TFWP recruitment has been described as a 
neoliberal “race to the bottom,” as agencies compete to send a cost-effective, profitable, 
and disciplined workforce to Canadian employers (agency 3, 03/22/14; Galvez, 2011). As 
explained by one agency: 
Employers ‘go shopping’ for agencies – which send ‘good workers, qualified 
workers, [which] make problems’… We send workers that have a need but fit 
the profile that the employer demands. It’s a business in this sense. I have to 
respect what the employer wants because otherwise the employer won’t be 
satisfied…. If you don’t send ‘good workers’, the employer cuts your contract 
[and goes somewhere else] (agency 6, 03/11/14). 
 
Recruiters classify Guatemalan labour that, upon obtaining a Canadian contract, 
will be legally excluded from full status in Canada, forced to the bottom of a multi-tiered 
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national labour market as categorically “low-skilled”48, temporary, bound to a single 
employer, without guaranteed access to social services or labour protections, often paid 
less than minimum wage, and without a path to permanent residency (Faraday, 2014; 
Walia, 2013). These structural requirements have been set out by the Canadian state and 
solidified through the migrant worker category (Sharma, 2006). Recruitment 
organizations have accordingly always operated in the interests of and received orders 
from Canadian institutions, as “without the employer, the TFWP would cease to exist”. In 
the words of agency staff: 
Everything we do is in accordance with [the Canadian agency or employer]. 
Without our Canadian counterpart, we wouldn’t sit here. I don’t care where 
the workers go, who goes, whatever, we do what the Canadians ask us to do 
(agency 3, 03/06/14). 
 
Recruitment is importantly a business, with agencies competing to offer a service to 
their clients, i.e. employers:  
There are a lot of employers. Companies here, like mine, we’re at their 
service. Our clients are the employers. If you give them a good service, the 
employers will be satisfied (agency 7, 03/25/14). 
 
Representatives reproduce Canadian recruitment criteria, implementing processes of 
worker classification and management according to nationality, race, gender, ability, and 
physical characteristics to satisfy employer demand – practices that I will elaborate on in 
chapter 6. In order to successfully accumulate Canadian contracts, an agency must, once 
again, meet employer interests:  
We’re responsible for the employer until the moment the worker arrives in 
Canada… There is nothing that I can do [for a worker] if the employer 
doesn’t want me to intervene. My legal mandate here is to do recruitment 
(agency 6, 03/11/14). 
 
Rather than keep employment accessible to Guatemalans, the TFWP has always 
been designed to make cheap labour available to Canadian employers. Agency costs for 
workers in the Pilot Program have always surpassed those of employers: the IOM began 
                                                             
48 “Low-skilled” national occupation classifications C and D comprise “intermediate jobs” requiring high 
school and/or job-specific training or labour jobs, respectively. This includes occupations in hospitality 
services, customer service, care labour, security, processing and manufacturing, construction, agriculture, 
landscaping, and natural resource labour, to name a few (HRSDC, 2011). In the case of Guatemala, most 
workers are confined to agriculture, landscaping, hospitality services, processing and manufacturing.  
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the Québec-Guatemala project by charging a hefty deposit of 4000Q (~$660CAN) per 
worker on top of additional processing fees – and continued to do so until 2010 – in order 
to keep costs low for Canadian employers (who paid approximately $120 per worker, less 
than total visa and work permit costs).49 This is because the program is employer-driven. 
When the IOM tried to raise the cost for Canadian employers to 240$ per worker in 2010, 
FERME, the Québec-based agricultural employers’ association, responded by creating an 
entirely new recruitment agency in Guatemala: Amigo Laboral. Amigo Laboral would 
“remain competitive” for Canadian employers by officially charging Guatemalan workers 
an administrative fee of approximately $530CAD. That same year, ACADEC, a 
Guatemala-based association, also began recruiting to enlist Guatemalan workers, 
charging steep sums of up to 80,000Q (~$12,830CAD) to add workers to a waiting pool 
through its partnership with a Canadian-based agency (CONAMIGUA, 2014; agency 8, 
05/14). Other agencies that formed after the IOM was shut down in 2013 also developed 
distinct fees50 and training processes, competing for Canadian employers by building 
diverse pools of codified labour available on demand. 
 
Temporary Employment as “Humanitarian Aid” 
Despite the indisputable employer-driven structure of temporary labour streams, the 
TFWP has since its’ inception been presented by the state, employers, and agencies alike 
as a charitable means of providing Canadian “foreign aid” to the global South (FARMS, 
2015). The Pilot Project in Guatemala has, in particular, long been portrayed as an 
initiative to “help the people of Guatemala” (IOM & SEGEPLAN, n.d., 3). IOM 
descriptors of the program emphasize the humanitarian benefits of temporary labour 
migration, claiming that the TFWP allows for a secure and orderly migration path, 
conforming to labour laws and norms that protect workers in Canada while advancing the 
                                                             
49 Although there are no existent statistics on this deposit’s return rate, former IOM employees and 
Guatemalan workers claim that hundreds (and perhaps thousands) of workers were never reimbursed this 
money even after having returned from Canada. According to one former IOM employee: “The problem is 
that once the worker travels he forgets he has the deposit” (03/25/14). Some workers are still pursuing the 
IOM for the return of this money, but, as there is no longer an existing IOM office in Guatemala, this process 
and, apparently, “no funds,” the organization claims that its’ hands are tied.   
50 Not only are costs a barrier for many workers, often pushing workers into debt, but Canadian legislation 
such as the recently-introduced “four and four” rule further push the TFWP to be out of reach for many 




economic development of workers from rural Guatemala51 (IOM, 2008). The TFWP has 
also been celebrated as a success by the IOM and considered a “model program” by the 
Canadian government as well as other countries worldwide, renowned as an archetype for 
“humane and orderly” managed migration (Preibisch and Hennebry, 2010; Walia, 2015; 
IOM, 2015).  
Recruiters echo this humanitarian narrative: the TFWP is frequently presented 
as a solution to widespread poverty in Guatemala from a benevolent Canada. 
Mirroring dominant accounts of the TFWP, agencies portray labour migration as a 
virtuous enterprise, with agency workers sacrificing themselves and even 
“volunteering” their time to “benefit the people of Guatemala”. The TFWP is 
presented as a selfless, charitable, and development-oriented project on the part of 
recruitment representatives and employers, facilitated by those who wish to “bring 
Guatemalans forward” and draw workers “out of backwardness” (agency 4, 
03/26/14). This image of charitable progress drives the expansion of temporary 
labour pools for recruiters, with employment itself described as a benevolent act: 
[When the IOM closed], Canadian employers called us and said, ‘you have to 
continue what you’re doing, it helps a lot of Guatemalans’ … It feels like you 
are changing someone’s life [by recruiting them to work in Canada]. Over the 
long term, we use temporary migration as a means to develop Guatemala… 
People don’t have a choice. They live from nothing, so they migrate… it’s a 
form of development for them. That is what they need (agency 6, 03/11/14). 
 
Framed as a simple means to fill low wage positions in Canada while solving 
rampant unemployment, the TFWP is often framed as a “win-win” model of for-
profit international cooperation: 
Our agency was created to help the people [of Guatemala]. We can help 
millions of people… The program helps all sides: the producer will have the 
work force he needs, will have real, qualified agricultural workers, and the 
agricultural worker will have the opportunity to support his family. People 
will be brought to work where work is needed. Zero discrimination, zero 
abuse (agency 8, 05/14). 
 
                                                             
51 According to the IOM’s website, the project’s objectives are to “facilitate a safe and organized migration” 
of Guatemalan workers and “contribute to the improvement of the economic conditions of workers from rural 
areas” in Guatemala (IOM, 2014). 
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Moreover, although Guatemalans carry out paid work as stipulated by employers 
similar to any other (untied) labour relationship, employers are presented as not 
merely providing employment, but also giving back to Guatemalan communities:  
The vision of our organization isn’t to make millions, but we’d simply like to 
be a tool to bring development to communities… Employers benefit from 
being able to count on a workforce, that way they can push their businesses 
forward and obtain a profit, but they also have a social feeling that they can 
bring something back to these people. There is a lot of need in Guatemala. So 
we’d like to work together… to benefit communities, for all of Guatemala 
(agency 7, 03/25/14). 
 
Rather than being declared a for-profit venture, worker recruitment is presented by 
agencies as an altruistic means to “give back” to communities. With employers kindly 
investing in Guatemalan labour, employer and agency-led social development is 
introduced as a natural by-product of worker employment. Indeed, the program is 
venerated as such a success that many agencies claim there is little to no possibility for 
labour discrimination or abuse – and temporary labour migration therefore the perfect 
form of trickle-down development. This is despite the fact that recruiters have no control 
over working conditions in Canada. Framing temporary employment as an act of 
Canadian – and agency – generosity, employers are presented as benevolently employing 
Guatemalans through the TFWP, with (mostly White, landholding) Canadians virtuously 
offering (mostly poor, landless, Indigenous or Mestizo) Guatemalans the “opportunity for 
development” (agency 6, 03/22/14).  
Many authors and labour rights organizations contend, however, that the TFWP 
institutionalizes a “revolving door” of precarious labour, granting employers exceptional 
power over workers, with workers bound to a single employer, unable to refuse work 
without the threat of deportation, working hazardous jobs in substandard conditions, and 
separated from their families, without the option of remaining in Canada. In fact, many 
declare that the program does the very opposite of the IOM’s stated objectives, rather: 
facilitating deliberately precarious labour conditions for migrants in Canada while 
contributing to the economic stability of Canadians before that of Guatemalans. This is 
accomplished in various ways, but, in particular: by immobilizing migrants within 
Canada’s national labour market, denying them access to the same protections as 
Canadians, deducting expenses from workers’ salaries, and making migrants ever-
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deportable and increasingly temporary52. Employers and the Canadian government – as 
well as Canadian society – profit from these structural constraints. For example, migrant 
workers are subject to the same rules as Canadians in paying taxes – paying into 
Canadian employment insurance premiums and the Canadian Pension Plan, as well as 
income and sales taxes – but cannot equally access government social benefits (Pang, 
2013). A 2013 parliamentary report53 specifically cites this lack of access as a way that 
Canadians “benefit” from migrant labour.  
Migrants accordingly subsidize both Canadian public services as well as Canada’s 
ability to be internationally competitive. Workers, meanwhile, are regarded as 
expendable. As summed up by No One is Illegal organizer Harsha Walia (2015):  
Everything about your time in Canada [as a migrant worker] is related to your 
ability to perform in the wage economy. If you get sick, you’re deported and 
can’t return. If you raise concerns with your employer and try to have a 
wildcat strike because you’re not allowed to unionize, you’re deported and 
[blacklisted]. Migrants are fundamentally treated as cheap labour and are 
commodified as cheap labour, and so, Canada has perfected the TFWP.  
 
With the TFWP framed as a kind of neoliberal humanitarianism, the structural precarity 
consolidated through the program itself is concealed. Meanwhile, migrant workers are 
often denied medical attention, face discrimination and abuse both at work and in the 
communities in which they work, must pay huge sums just to be enlisted for employment, 
and are faced with the constant possibility of deportation and blacklisting. Employers, 
meanwhile, have the power to make whatever deductions to workers’ pay that they see 
fit, from exorbitant rent54 to charging for the use of utensils or furniture, transport, phone 
calls, money transfers, application costs, etc. (see table 4). A minimum of roughly 
77.53$ per week per worker is deducted by employers and the state (about 18% of 
weekly earnings), as well as a potential additional $2,470CAD per yearly trip to Canada, 
not including agency recruitment costs (for a worker paid Québec’s minimum wage of 
10.55$ per hour, working 40 hours per week for a total weekly salary of $422CAD) 
(MIDI, 2015). In this way – by making workers institutionally disposable while 
                                                             
52 Once again, through the “four and four” rule effective as of April 1, 2011.  
53 See the 2013 Parliamentary Background paper by Pang.  
54 Agency documents show that workers are charged an average of $45CAD per week in rent, despite the 
fact that the legal maximum employers can charge is $30CAD per week. Workers have reported paying far 
higher sums, which are deducted from their salaries (CIC, 2012; IOM, 2010).  
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productively upholding Canada’s economy and continually framing White Canada as 
“good” – the state has, as expressed by Walia, “perfected the TFWP”.  
 
TABLE 4. POTENTIAL WORKER PAY DEDUCTIONS ONCE IN CANADA 
Canadian Pension Plan 4.95% of monthly salary 
Employment Insurance 1.53% of monthly salary 
Parental Insurance 0.4% of monthly salary 
Preparation of tax declaration55 $40-50 per year  
RBC Medical Insurance $3.50 per week 
Room rent $30-45+ per week  
Return flight Guatemala-Canada $800-$1,200 
Recruiter fees for employers $1.50 per day per worker or 
120-220$ 
Use of utensils, furniture, transport, etc. Varies, n/a  
LMIA fee $275 until 2014; now 
$1000 
 
 (IOM, 2010: see appendix 4; ESDC, 2014; CIC, 2012; agency and worker interviews) 
 
Lawful Movement 
This narrative of TFWP virtuosity is backed by the notion of temporary labour migration 
as a lawful means of employment. Designed by the Canadian government and supported 
by the government of Guatemala, migrating and working legally in Canada through the 
TFWP is depicted as an assured, controlled, secure option in comparison to widespread 
undocumented migration northward and poorly paid employment in Guatemala. 
Allegedly “free from risk,” lawfulness is used as a basis to promote the program as well 
as justify training add-ons and other costs needed to create the “qualified,” disciplined 
workforce needed for “legal work”. This is despite the fact that laws concerning labour 
migration in Guatemala have not been reformed since 1948 and that temporary labour 
migration legally creates a multi-tiered labour system in which particular workers are 
denied particular rights based on their temporary status56 – legally binding workers to 
their employer, legally making workers deportable, and legally denying workers access to 
the state benefits that they pay into. In sum, the labour precarity systemically embedded 
                                                             
55 In Québec, the Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA) has a monopoly on tax declarations for migrant 
workers.  
56 For example, migrant workers technically cannot unionize in Québec (CDPDJ, 2014). Moreover, workers 
are often deported before they are able to fully process a labour claim (Preibisch, 2007).  
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in the TFWP is eclipsed by the notion of legality itself as being naturally virtuous or 
ethical.  
The fact that the TFWP is a lawful structure also projects the notion of “order” 
and “control” in recruitment, promoting and justifying discriminatory hiring processes to 
effectively reinforce the power of agencies – as well as that of employers and 
governments. With legally drawn TFWP structures, one is given the impression that there 
is no need to scrutinize the temporary labour process, for, after all, it has been “legally 
sanctioned”. As explained by one agency: 
We offer a contract… where the person will be respected with physical 
integrity, according to Canadian law. We do a professional selection process 
to send trustworthy workers, and obviously if we’re sending adequate human 
capital to a qualified company, then they should be taking into account the 
human and legal rights of the person (agency 4, 04/26/14).  
 
Because workers travel to Canada legally, the process itself is viewed as “more 
controlled” (agency 6, 03/11/14). Recruitment organizations emphasize the intrinsic 
ethical legality of the TFWP, constructing Canadian space as lawful, moral and 
ordered. As stated by another recruiter, the selection process “is ethical in a sense 
that it is legal” (agency 5, 03/25/14). This narrative of TFWP legality is strikingly 
similar to long-established colonial narratives in which morally-righteous legal 
systems forged from regimes of racial power institutionalize and justify the 
violence of dispossession through law and codified difference, such as in regimes 
of apartheid, indentureship and slavery as found in the histories of Guatemala and 
Canada (Thobani, 2007). Although capitalist laws create the unjust work conditions 
to allow for exploitation to take place, the morality and power of the legal system is 
exalted as absolute, furthering possibilities for abuse. Agencies use legal status as a 
means to legitimize exorbitant costs and fraud. As expressed by one group that has 
been accused of charging workers 80,000Q (~$12,800CAD) in pre-departure costs: 
“We’re completely legal, so that people go to Canada legally. Everything we do is 
legal” (agency 1, 03/04/14; CONAMIGUA, 2014).  
Agency representatives, meanwhile, assert that accessible legal avenues exist for 
workers to pursue justice in Canada: workers “can make complaints,” and so it is often 
workers, rather than employers or the state, who are framed as “the problem” – either by 
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keeping silent, not working hard enough, being “under-qualified,” or else simply being 
unable to “take advantage” of the opportunity handed to them by Canadians (agency 3, 
02/22/14; agency 6). According to workers, however, it is the very notion of an 
overarching institutional – and lawful – “order” that drives worker precarity: 
I think you’re made more vulnerable with the IOM, because if you try to 
speak out about abuses that are happening, they will say that they aren’t 
happening, and because this organization is an international organization for 
migration, that is supposed to manage migration, to make migration orderly, I 
don’t think that there is any space for debate. That is to say, if the 
organization violates the laws or doesn’t respect your rights, they’re going to 
say that it isn’t true, that the IOM wouldn’t do that, that the [Guatemalan] 
Consulate or Canadian government doesn’t do that, and so in this way the 
reputation of an organization actually helps to further displace people… it 
doesn’t give credibility to the people who live with these injustices… It is not 
the victim – if there is a victim – that gets credibility, but rather the 
[employer, government, or recruitment] organization (Guatemalan worker, 
01/14).   
 
The authority of organizational control and legality effectively works to uphold 
exploitative labour relationships. Meanwhile, an absence of worker support 
mechanisms within TFWP structures leaves many migrants isolated: 
Canada [is] supposed to be a country that protects the human rights of people, 
but here it’s worse than in Guatemala, where rights are violated all the time, 
here it’s worse, here they prohibit you from forming relationships with the 
people who want to help you (Guatemalan worker, 05/14).  
 
Rather than facilitate or encourage outside support systems, many employers and 
agencies have forbidden migrant workers from developing relationships outside of 
their work, particularly with labour rights organizations or members of the opposite 
sex (UFCW, 2013). This further segregates workers in Canada, who have already 
been forced to leave their families behind in Guatemala and are often based in 
remote rural areas, with limited access to modes of transport.57 Another worker 
describes his experience: 
Guatemala is an underdeveloped country, a country that is behind other 
countries like Canada, so [in Canada] they should treat the people who go to 
work there with respect. But I wouldn’t go back there for anything. The lack 
of [medical] attention, the work overload, the poor care… I was left without 
                                                             
57 Moreover, travel documents are also often confiscated by employers, making it difficult for workers to be 
mobile (UFCW, 2013).  
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support, without work, in bad health, and I lost 4000Q (~$660CAD) 
(Guatemalan worker, 02/24/14).  
 
With Canada exalted as a “developed” nation with a “perfectly good” legal system, the 
continual construction of labour precarity through the binding of migrants to their 
employer and denial of permanent status by the Canadian state is normalized. The power 
and practices of the IOM and subsequent recruitment agencies, meanwhile, are also 
normalized. It is this normalization of temporary employment and recruitment as 
“lawful” and “good” that contributes to the lack of support available to migrants, who 
have to navigate a transnational system – in a language they are not fluent in – that has 
explicitly been designed to create labour insecurity. As such, Canada’s dominant 
narrative as a rights-respecting country serves to substantially exacerbate circumstances 
of labour precarity, invisibilizing the abuses that the system fully facilitates. This is also 
the case for recruitment organizations that claim to be humanitarian, ordering movement 
“for the benefit of all” – supposedly incapable of inciting violence or displacement and so 
unaccountable to the workers who experience these violations. Without any structural 
mechanisms in place for migrant support by either the Canadian government or recruiters, 
declaring altruistic aims for Guatemalan workers while in reality actively contributing to 
conditions of precarity effectively heightens worker vulnerability, reinforcing state, 
employer, and agency power while delegitimizing the claims of those workers who try to 
challenge situations of oppression.  
Meanwhile, workers allege that agencies have committed an array of abuses in 
recruitment: from charging exorbitant fees, enlisting workers with false promises of 
going to Canada, and creating extra trainings and add-ons to make the selection process 
more lucrative, to providing the wrong information about what work will be required, 
what workers’ wages will be, what deductions will be made for food and rent, and even 
fraudulently assuring workers that they will gain access to permanent residency after 
having worked in the TFWP. Rendered structurally precarious, with no labour protections 
or guarantees of employment, workers in this sense are forced to rely on the benevolence 
of recruitment agencies and employers. As voiced by an agency representative: 
People profit from this. It’s a dirty business. It’s easy to go and say, pay me 
10,000Q (~$1,664CAN) and I’ll send you to Canada tomorrow. They pay me 
and then I have the money. That’s how it works here… It’s a dirty business 
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because it’s a way to make money. Because people here [in Guatemala] are 
so desperate… For the same reason that someone will say, ‘how much would 
you pay to have a visa to the US,’ ‘I would pay anything, I would sell my 
house, and I gave the money to one of your men but I’ve never gotten the 
chance to travel and now I’ve lost everything, I live in the street now’. People 
profit from the needs of others... Agencies create the possibility for abuse 
(agency 6, 03/11/14). 
 
Despite claiming order through a legally sanctioned system, agencies conflictingly admit 
the lack of control they hold in the recruitment process itself, with some asserting that 
their organizations have been impersonated by outsiders, to having staff within their own 
ranks charging workers excessive fees, or even workers charging workers for making 
hiring recommendations. As rumours of work in Canada spread far and wide, with no 
transparency on process or costs and the freedom to recruit everywhere, many agencies 
declare that exploitation is indeed rampant, with rival recruitment groups described as 
“basically legal coyotes” (agency 5, 03/26/14). Workers have accused at least five of the 
seven agencies currently operating in Guatemala of fraud and exploitation 
(CONAMIGUA, 2014).  
Recruitment costs typically force migrants into precarious conditions before they 
have arrived in Canada, intensifying conditions of labour insecurity in the TFWP as a 
whole (Faraday, 2014). Migrant workers in all TFWP streams – as well as those who 
never make it to Canada – are reported to be routinely charged hundreds to thousands of 
dollars each in recruitment fees, pushing workers to take out heavy loans and even sign 
over the deeds to their homes to meet migration costs (Faraday, 2014; Palacios, 2013). 
Guatemalan workers are no exception to this: thirty-four out of thirty-eight workers 
interviewed revealed having to take out loans in order to meet recruitment costs, most of 
whom mortgaged their homes or else borrowed money from high-interest brokers. One 
worker explains his situation: 
I mortgaged my house to be able to take a loan out at the bank because that 
was what the bank asked me to do. I had to have a security deposit in case I 
wouldn’t be able to pay, for the bank. So that the person I paid the money to 
[for recruitment] wouldn’t have any problems. Right now I am barely making 
any money, 185$ every 15 days, and from the little money I receive I have to 
pay 800Q (~$125CAD) [each month] just to the bank, plus the costs of 




Exorbitant costs drive workers into precarity early on, increasing the vulnerability of tied 
employment and pushing individuals to labour in risky circumstances to pay off accrued 
debts. Although Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) regulations58 
stipulate that employers must pay all travel costs related to hiring, with highly 
imbalanced power dynamics, no contracts in Spanish, rising immigration application 
costs, and no structural oversight, it is workers who most bear the weight of growing 
TFWP payments – from travel59 to visa and work permit costs, as well as additional 
recruitment fees (ESDC, 2012 & 2015). Many workers and their families are driven into 
greater precarity than before having migrated or paid fraudulent processing fees, 
depending on the price tag of recruitment (Faraday, 2014). As described by one worker, 
“everything has a cost”: from trainings to language lessons, uniforms, equipment, 
polygraph tests, medical and physical examinations, visa and work permit processing 
costs, etc. These costs have been condemned by workers: 
[Individuals and agencies] should stop charging people money. There are 
people who have paid too much money… there are people charging upwards 
of 25000-30000Q (~$4,000-$4,800CAD) just to put workers into the 
program” (Guatemalan worker, 05/14). 
 
While it is true that Guatemalan workers have many reasons to migrate and will 
go to great lengths to do so, presenting Canadian employers and labour recruitment 
agencies as “saviors” and the Pilot Program as an initiative intended to benefit 
Guatemalan workers is highly problematic. Not only does this narrative overlook the 
stated Canadian government objectives of the TFWP and the very conditions of perpetual 
displacement, precarity, and apartheid that the program creates and maintains, it also 
glosses over the disproportionate power that employers and agencies hold, bolstering 
impunity while naturalizing exploitation and dispossession – all the while maintaining 
that workers should be “grateful”. Moreover, it negates the agency of workers 
                                                             
58 ESDC states that employers who choose to use recruitment services “must pay for all of the fees 
associated with the service and meet all of the applicable requirements” (ESDC, 2015, para. 49). This 
includes the 155$ required for each worker’s visa and work permit (FARMS, 2014; ESDC, 2015). Moreover, 
recruitment officials receiving compensation from employers must also be authorized under section 91 of the 
IRPA to “be a member in good standing with” a Canadian law society, whether the Chambre des notaires du 
Québec, the Province of Ontario’s law society as a paralegal, or the Immigration Consultants of Canada 
Regulatory Council (ICCRC) (ESDC, 2015). Most Canadian or Guatemala-based agencies do not have 
these qualifications.  
59 Some employers do not even cover any portion of workers’ travel costs. There is specific evidence that 
Savora, a company in Québec, did not cover travel costs for migrant workers (Trembley, 2015; IOM, 2010). 
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themselves, reinforcing capitalist White supremacist notions of “development”. 
Outwardly declaring labour security through the TFWP’s supposedly superior legality 
and “benevolent aims” dangerously obscures the very real risks and forms of 
discrimination that workers may face upon joining recruitment for Canada’s temporary 
labour force, deceptively concealing the true motives of the TFWP – capital accumulation 
– while also naturalizing exploitation. Employer-driven and state-powered, the TFWP is 
designed to bestow power into the hands of employers, confining workers to a particular 
job and subclass in Canada’s labour market and excluding workers from society at large. 
Workers are positioned as perpetually displaceable and disposable. The lawful, altruistic 
image that agencies dominantly project of Canada and temporary labour itself, and the 
structural reality of precariousness both during recruitment in Guatemala and work in 







It happened three times.  
I first heard about the option of working in Canada in 1991, but never tried to do it. A few 
people were coordinating possibilities to go there to work. They said it was to do 
agricultural labour on farms, and spoke about what people in Canada did, planting, 
picking fruit or flowers; that is what they told me then.  
It wasn’t until 2010 that I became interested; employment circumstances were changing 
and I was left without work. I saw it as a way to survive, to support my three daughters, 
and so I made the arrangements. Recruiters brought me to a farm just beyond the valley, 
to discuss going to Canada. They told me that I would have to wait, as everything 
happened according to when people came, and there were others already waiting to go. It 
was necessary to leave an initial deposit; then they would send you to Canada. When I 
returned a few weeks later, they were gone. Their families said that they had left to make 
travel arrangements and finalize paperwork, but they never reappeared, so I let it be.  
Later on, another recruitment organization formed in the next town over. Rumour had it 
that it was formal, without the possibility of risk, and that you had to leave a deposit in 
order to secure a spot. They gave us an account number, where we had to transfer the 
deposit; the only proof we had was the payment receipt of 10000Q. That was the cost of 
the trip. Recruiters would call us together for meetings at different places, in town, at the 
gas station, or in the homes of the organizers, and would share information that couldn’t 
have been true, because they always said we would travel in one month, then in another 
month, and another, and this was repeated until it had been over a year. It never 
happened. We were a big group, maybe 25 people, so imagine that, at 10000Q each. 
Afterwards, ACADEC appeared, and again I saw the potential for a better life. Here in 
Guatemala, when you see something that might improve your life, to live with a little more 
economic stability, to support your family, you take it. So when they told me about 
ACADEC, I decided to take the opportunity. I went to their offices in Chimaltenango, to a 
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big farm where they had meetings. Everything seemed in order, it didn’t seem like a scam 
or a lie. Everything was formalized, the paperwork, everything: we got passports, did 
tests, gave them all of our papers. They brought us to a clinic where we did a blood exam. 
Supposedly things were going forward, arrangements were being made. It was to work on 
Canadian farms, to work in the fields. After the paperwork, we had to pass a training on 
Canadian farming, where they gave lectures and spoke about agriculture, how to plant, 
etc., giving us all kinds of information and testing us about the work we would do in 
Canada. We got a diploma at the end, to certify us. The training cost was 2000Q. They 
said it was the price to prepare us to work in Canada. One day, they even brought us to a 
house and took our measurements for what they said would be uniforms and equipment. 
This also had a cost. Everything had a cost.  
They would always receive us, give us information and tell us that everything was fine. 
Everything seemed so official. They would speak about Canadian representatives from 
Montreal that would come to Guatemala and were in charge of the paperwork, but I never 
saw them, never met them. They said it was a long process and that’s why we hadn’t gone 
yet. It was a way for them to get easy money, imagine, with 50 people paying about 
10000Q each. Two years passed and we never went. I don’t go to the farm anymore, or to 
meetings, because, like before, they always said we would go next month, and then the 
next month after that, and the next, and the next.  
This situation happens not because people are stupid, but because people are desperate. 
You believe you’ll be able to recuperate the money you invest because obviously you can 
make a lot more money in Canada, salaries are better than here, and so you make deals to 
be able to get this money and pay for the paperwork, and be part of the group that might 
travel. And if you don’t have the money, if you don’t have cash, they accept loans, they 
accept cars, payment agreements, or you take out credit at the bank and leave your 
property as the guarantee. Or you turn to moneylenders, with high interest rates, who 
charge even more, and so you are left much more indebted, with more problems. These 
are the things they take advantage of. 
My economic situation has gotten worse and so I’m always looking for ways to get some 
more stability, to recuperate my home, to have a more steady job, because I have three 
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daughters, you know, that’s why I’m always fighting. I’m still looking for opportunities to 
work in Canada, but, well, they have always been lies, always. Yet here we are, thank the 
Lord, standing up and moving forward, each day an opportunity to rise up little by little. 
And if it happens – because I’m going to keep searching and I’m going to contact these 
new agencies – it’s because it was meant for me. Perhaps I’ve been looking in the wrong 






Chapter 6: NARRATING THE “GOOD” WORKER 
In the Guatemala-to-Canada “revolving door” of labour migration, nearly a dozen private 
agencies are operating in both Guatemala and Canada to recruit workers – actively 
screening, evaluating, classifying, and ranking candidates who hope to labour in Canada. 
On a search for the “good” worker to satisfy employer demand, agencies carry out various 
tests and trainings – which may last from a few days or weeks to many years, each with a 
cost – to determine whether or not a particular individual may meet Canadian criteria and, 
in turn, be “worthy” of waiting for a Canadian contract. In seeking out the desirable 
worker, recruiters sort migrants according to explicitly nationalized, racialized, gendered, 
and ableist characteristics as set out by Canadian institutions and employers, reproducing 
differential categories – and subjectivities – of workers through the bordering practices of 
classification and containment. As expressed by one worker: “This is where the 
discrimination begins” (Guatemalan worker, 01/14).  
This chapter will examine the place-based narratives of those who engage in 
TFWP recruitment practices, making visible a component of the labour migration process 
that is often concealed from Canada and uncovering the discourses that underpin daily 
TFWP operations in Guatemala. By unmapping the narratives that uphold the 
classification and containment of migrant workers in Guatemala and Canada, I hope to 
show how the migrant worker category – and the apartheid of mobility more generally – is 
constantly being constructed and naturalized on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, by 
specifically examining worker recruitment and selection, I aim to present a more 
expansive perspective of the making of difference, unsettling the boundaries of the 
temporary worker category by highlighting the production and management of the “good” 
worker subject in Guatemala.  
 
CLASSIFICATION: ORGANIZING DIFFERENCE 
The classification of Guatemalan workers is used as a means to sort as well as capitalize 
on applicants who wish to labour in Canada. Ranging in process from long hours of 
training to short informational talks, elaborate or simple interviews, security screenings, 
physical and mental assessments, and agricultural examinations, agencies have developed 
extensive processes for the recruitment of workers to Canada. Private agencies enlist 
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workers by making visits to rural areas, through recommendations from workers who have 
already gone to Canada, or by receiving workers in their offices or agricultural terrain who 
have heard about the possibility of working in Canada through word of mouth. Many 
Guatemalan agencies charge thousands of Quetzales60 just to receive a new applicant or 
else ask workers to progressively “invest” in their training if they hope to be sent to a 
Canadian employer.  
 
FIGURE 6. HOW INTERVIEWED WORKERS JOINED THE TFWP 
 
 
Recruiters typically begin worker classification with an interview and personal 
evaluation – which “has nothing to do with the work in Canada” but is used to verify 
one’s “moral character” (agency 6, 02/25/14). The intermediaries between Canada and 
Guatemala, agencies are regarded as both experts on the immigration process as well as 
Canada itself. Recruitment unfolds beneath the backdrop of an imagined Canada – 
agencies recruit particular workers to satisfy Canadian demand, and so carry out selection 
in the name of Canadian interests. With this in mind, various groups have developed 
detailed training programs in Guatemala “to prepare and certify” workers specifically to 
meet Canadian labour needs (See photos 1-6 in appendix 6). Supplemental screenings and 
trainings61 that mirror imagined Canadian agricultural practices have become increasingly 
commonplace, each with a distinct fee, giving companies the opportunity to profit from 
workers while competing for contracts. Agency representatives emphasize the importance 
of behaving according to the expectations and demands of Canadians – in everything from 
work tasks to personal habits. As described by agency staff: 
                                                             
60 Guatemalan currency. 
61 Including but not limited to: polygraph tests, observational testing, agronomist agricultural training, 
language classes.  
IOM came to the community
Recruiter via word of mouth
Through a friend
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
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We, in a visionary way, ask workers to think that what they’re doing here [in 
the training centre] is what they’ll be doing in Canada. Arriving from their 
home, to an unknown place, and they have to become familiar with the 
environment, the climate, and the work. So… we give them instructions of 
how they should behave, what to do, what not to do… we try to make sure that 
everything is in order, that everything [is done] obediently: personal hygiene, 
eating habits, listening and receiving orders, everything… we have people 
from all over Guatemala and it is growing everyday (agency 2, 03/18/14).   
 
Some agencies offer extensive “preparation” sessions and tests specifically geared to 
Canadian crops and Canadian agricultural expertise:   
Then we begin the training, which has been elaborated by agronomist 
engineers. It is a work plan, 80 hours in agricultural training… We have a 
specific area, so that the workers really do the work – planting, packaging, 
cleaning, etc. – whatever they’ll have to do in Canada (agency 5, 03/26/14). 
 
At the end of these trainings, recruits are given a diploma for working in Canada 
(see photos 5 and 6 of appendix 6). For one agency, not only are training sessions 
necessary, but an individual must also emerge as a “leader” and participate in the 
organization for years before they might be considered for a Canadian contract:  
You have to spend two years being tested, where you have to carry out 
missions, participate in trainings, meetings, organizations, all of that…. If you 
are a good leader… you can be accepted (agency 1, 03/18/14).  
 
 Canadian jobs are presented as exalted positions only for the most moral, qualified, 
and obedient “good” worker in Guatemala. To qualify in recruitment, all aspects of a 
worker’s life are examined to decide whether they may qualify for a contract or be 
permitted to enter the brimming candidate waiting pool – from family relations, lifestyle, 
position in the community, commitment to returning to Guatemala, etc. Various agencies 
declare having 1-2 week programs in which workers must “donate” 40-80 hours of work 
as well as pay a training fee (See table 5). This is described as part of a “package deal” to 
go to Canada – if a worker is able to prove “obedience” and efficiency in carrying out 
tasks. Some agencies have created training programs designed from TFWP informational 
videos produced by the Canadian and Québecois governments, with support from 
“certified agronomists and engineers” in Guatemala as well as Canada-based agencies 
(agency 5, 03/26/14). Trainings are described as a means to ensure “a professional 
selection process” and guarantee that candidates are truly agricultural labourers. Once a 
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worker has been trained, and, in some cases, also paid pre-departure costs, their names are 
added to a growing waiting list.   
 
TABLE 5. LIST OF POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT FEES62  
DOCUMENT TYPE COST IN 
QUETZALES 
APPROXIMATE COST IN 
CAD 
Visa and Work Permit 1,140Q to 3,500Q  $184 to $566 
Training and Selection 1,000Q to 80,000Q  $162 to $12,935 
Taking names 250Q to 3,000Q  $40 to $485 
Agency service fee 930Q to 2,670Q  $150 to $432 
Guatemala Medical Insurance 260Q  $42 
Medical exam 670Q to 1,375Q  $108 to $222 
Guatemala Airport Tax 250Q  $40 
Deposit (until 2009) 4000Q  $650 
Visa Application Centre fee  540Q $87 
Guatemala security deposit (afianza) 372Q $60 
Canada Airport Tax 330Q $53 
Additional costs Passport, (inter)national and municipal travel, 
photos, photocopies, criminal check, polygraph 
test, agricultural letter, uniforms, equipment, etc.  
Total recruitment costs (not including 
abovementioned additional costs) 
Range from 3,225Q 
to 80,000Q 
Range from $522 to 
$12,935 
 
TABLE 6. REQUIRED RECRUITMENT DOCUMENTS FOR WORKERS 
Passport, ID, and personal information; as well as the ID and personal 
information of your partner, parents, and kids; Photos 
Criminal Background Check 
Payments for Visa and Work Permit 
Proof of address 
Photocopies of marriage license and driver's license, if applicable 
Photocopies of your children's birth certificates 
Letter of recommendation, agricultural letter 
Certified copies of proof of study for 6th grade education 
Proof of having passed physical exam, medical exam, eye exam, trainings, 
screenings, etc. 
If already gone to Canada, letter of recommendation from Canadian 
employer 
 
 On a quest to secure contracts and appease employers, agencies strive to secure the 
“good” worker through bankrolled add-ons that demonstrate labour expertise and 
dependability. The “good” worker subject is described by agencies as having particular, 
ideal qualities: honest, honorable, moral, pristine legal status (i.e. never deported), 
trustworthy, consistent mental and physical health, obedient work ethic and a capacity to 
                                                             
62 These are the various costs given to me by recruitment agencies, in recruitment documents and visa word 
of mouth (IOM, 2009; Amigo Laboral, 2014; etc.).  
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obey, good personal hygiene and eating habits, ability to withstand extreme weather, 
qualified, equipped with agricultural expertise, physical strength and endurance, family in 
Guatemala in order to ensure return, etc. Candidates must be between approximately 20 
and 40 years old, have equivalent to or less than a sixth grade education, no criminal 
record, must pass a medical exam and be able to prove that they are authentic agricultural 
workers. In order to prove the abovementioned qualities, workers must spend many hours 
collecting the documents demanded by recruiters, making repeated visits to and from the 
capital city to gain proof in order to be considered eligible. Agencies emphasize the long 
and intricate process of evaluating a candidate’s qualities in determining who will be 
considered for a Canadian contract: 
We send people who have been investigated…in the first screening, we 
investigate the applicant, make sure that the person isn’t bad, but honorable, 
humble but honorable. Second, we check their mental and physical capacities 
to make sure that they’re capable of working and can handle 10-11 months 
outside their country and away from their home, with the commitment of 
returning. This is another challenge because people go [to Canada] and don’t 
want to come back…We make sure the applicant has family here and is 
actually going to return (agency 4, 03/26/14).  
 
Representatives assert the importance of obtaining “honourable,” “good,” qualified, 
and trustworthy applicants who will remain temporary, returning to Guatemala upon 
the completion of a contract. To guarantee workers’ temporariness in Canada, 
families are separated, with partners and children unable to accompany workers – 
who are often heads of families – to Canada. This fragmentation of families 
contributes to the formation of “good” workers. Having family remain in Guatemala 
further guarantees migrants’ return as well as contributes to their position as 
“distinct” from Canadian society, maximizing possibilities for labour efficiency 
while setting them apart as workers. Candidates, meanwhile, are described as 
handpicked, prepared and dutiful:  
We don’t just take a random person from the park. We train people. If 
someone asks us for five workers, they’re going to be well-trained, well-
studied, and well-exercised, we’re not just going to send anyone… We’re 
worried that people who go [to Canada] aren’t really farmers… We make sure 
that our workers have been well-trained, psychologically as well as physically 




Agencies, moreover, highlight their own critical role in guaranteeing that clients – 
employers – are satisfied:  
We have to be careful to choose the right people, to make sure the employer is 
satisfied. So it’s a business in this sense, to send the ‘good’ worker (agency 6, 
03/11/14).  
 
With White Canadian space depicted as ethical, ordered, and lawful, classification 
schemas and comprehensive trainings are depicted as necessary in (a disordered, immoral) 
Guatemala to foster control and reproduce homogeneity within the low-skilled migrant 
worker category, ensuring that only “good” workers be granted a Canadian contract. One 
agency cited using a polygraph test to guarantee that candidates were truly “honorable and 
ethical”– i.e. that they would not overstay their visas, were not involved in criminal 
activity, and were authentic campesinos. A common concern that recruiters shared was 
that of Guatemalan workers “abusing the system” and thus cheating “good employers” – 
either by legally returning to Canada too many years in a row (and therefore becoming 
versed in how the system itself functions), remaining in Canada after an expired visa or 
work permit, not adequately following employer orders, and/or not being “legitimate” 
agricultural producers – this despite the fact that most workers interviewed reported 
having indeed worked in agriculture prior to the TFWP (see figure 6). With workers 
framed as those who must be constantly investigated and screened for criminality and 
“agricultural fraud,” the moral authority of private recruitment institutions – as well as 
Canada itself – is repeatedly reinforced.  
 














Many agencies have added steps to examine workers, with the aim of providing 
“quality selection” for Canadians: from physical examinations, open-ended interviews, 
proof of qualifications, to enlisting workers who are considered “low-risk” to employers 
(i.e. they will never be permanent) and providing extensive training and testing sessions. 
As emphasized by one agency: “Screenings are done by us [agencies], not by the 
Canadian Embassy” (agency 6, 03/11/14/). Ongoing worker evaluations ensure agency 
oversight throughout the recruitment process, differentiating between “suitable” and 
“unsuitable” workers. Agencies emphasize that agricultural expertise is central to the 
lucrative operation of the TFWP: rather than being “low-skilled,” as Canada claims, 
recruiters assert that demands from Canada are often very specific, with several distinct 
characteristics and qualifications requested. As such, agencies commonly seek out 
workers who meet very particular, skilled criteria:  
The other day we had a company on the south shore of Outaouais ask for 
someone who knows how to breed, feed, vaccinate, and take care of cows, can 
do construction, paint, and operate a tractor…finally there was only one 
applicant [out of hundreds] who knew how to do all of that and I sent him. 
He’s going to do everything (agency 6, 03/11/14).   
 
In order to be considered for a job, moreover, workers are asked to provide solid evidence 
of their specialization in agriculture:  
[We need] proof that they are agricultural workers, of what they specialize in. 
We’re not going to bring someone who works in plumbing to come kill 
chickens. That doesn’t make any sense (agency 7, 05/14).  
 
Candidates are generally asked to provide a letter of recommendation, “to prove they are 
really from X village and are farmers,” signed by the mayor of the community or 
municipality “because we can’t just send anyone to work” (agency 1, 03/04/14). A strong 
emphasis exists to ensure that candidates have even been trained to handle the particular 
crop they will be working with in Canada, with employers explicitly seeking out workers 
who already have years of experience:   
You need workers in the agricultural sector that can say this is a tomato, this is 
a bean, this is a carrot; they need to know what’s going on. If you go to a 
coffee grower and tell him this is a snow pea, he will not know. So this means, 
although the program is called ‘unskilled’, it’s skilled in the agricultural 
sector. People are skilled, they are very, very good… If an applicant comes 
here and we really see that he is an agricultural worker, we have a person look 




Specific requests from Canada narrow down those workers who may be eligible for a job, 
allowing employers to access knowledgeable farmers with extensive expertise in 
particular crops, livestock care, greenhouses, operating specific machines and equipment, 
etc. Expertise is also used by some agencies as a means to sell additional tests and 
trainings and add general costs for workers, making individuals more marketable, with 
training sessions described as a means to “make sure that people have fulfilled the 
requirements” (agency 1, 04/04/14).  
Narratives of agencies’ established moral authority – resting on their declared 
connection to an exalted Canada and underlying claims to philanthropy – are in turn used 
to normalize explicitly racialized and gendered processes of differentiation that have been 
requested by Canadians. To meet employer demands, agency representatives recruit 
workers from regions of Guatemala that are known for particular agricultural practices, 
climate, racial character, culture, etc., with the largest numbers of workers coming from 
the departments of Chimaltenango, El Progreso, San Marcos, Sacatepéquez, Guatemala, 
Jutiapa, and Santa Rosa. As agencies emphasize the lawful and managed nature of the 
temporary migration process, the sorting of labour candidates according to regional 
classifying schemas that are overtly gendered and racialized is presented as essential for 
delivering “qualified human capital” to an imagined Canada:  
The [Canadian] agency contacts us and says I need 10 workers for a tomato 
greenhouse, so get us workers that measure more than X, that weigh about X 
amount, that are able to pick up boxes of tomatoes… If you want someone for 
chicken catching, they have to measure about six feet and be able to do the work and 
catch the chickens. Those in Chimaltenango are about five feet tall…so they 
wouldn’t be able to do it. So [recruitment] is strategic according to the kind of work 
that is requested. We know the regions where people are from here in Guatemala 
(agency 6, 03/11/14).  
 
Employers may specify the height, weight, age, and physical characteristics of the 
workers they wish to hire. With particular physical characteristics associated with 
different agricultural sectors, classification comes to distinguish which kinds of 
workers – and regions – are more suitable for which kinds of employment:  
There are demands for specific kinds of people: the employer tells us that he needs 
someone between the age of 25 and 30, who measures 1.7 metres, for a chicken 
farm, so we need someone who is tall, but if it is to cut cabbage, lettuce, or broccoli, 
we need someone who is shorter and a different age, and that is where worker 




Some representatives even cite the climate as a means to determine if workers from 
particular areas might be more “suited” for work in Canada:  
Usually [Canadians] ask for people from San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, or 
Huehuetenango, because these are the highlands, with cold seasons. [Employers] ask 
for cold regions, for workers who can tolerate the cold (agency 4, 03/26/14).  
 
To be distinguished as capable of performing Canadian agricultural labour, 
therefore, workers are regarded as having to possess particular physical traits, catalogued 
according to individual height, weight, sex, eyesight, endurance, physical strength, agility, 
geographical region, etc., depending on the sector in question. Recruitment often targets 
particular regions of Guatemala depending on the characteristics that have been requested 
by an employer – with some regions known as being more ladino or Indigenous, 
consisting of differing topographies and agricultural practices, and certain identities prized 
above others for specific kinds of employment. Maya Ka’chiquel workers from 
Chimaltenango, for example, make up the majority of Guatemalan workers who harvest 
Canadian fields, with some Canadian employers visiting Guatemala each year to hand-
pick workers alongside recruiters in that region; while Santa Rosa is a predominantly 
ladino area, where workers are mostly recruited for chicken-catching (agency 3, 03/22/14; 
agency 6, 03/11/14). A worker’s region of origin is seen as tangibly contributing to their 
expertise, qualities, physical strength, and “ability to tolerate the climate,” with certain 
regions referenced by agencies as inherently containing “better” workers for labouring in 
Canada – such as Chimaltenango, El Progreso, and Santa Rosa. As a result, other areas are 
also ruled out for work in certain sectors if they are said to have “bad workers”. For 
example: 
The first time workers were brought to Canada from [the region of] San 
Marcos, it was a disaster, because they are very good with their hands to cut 
coffee, but they were not good for lettuce (agency 3, 03/22/14).  
 
In many ways, the overtly racialized recruitment requirements used in migrant 
worker selection mirror the racially exclusive criteria that dominated 19th and 20th century 
immigration policy in Canada. The 1910 Immigration Act, for example, specifically 
barred races deemed “unsuitable to the climate…of any specified class, occupation, or 
character” (i.e. non-White) from entering Canada,63 unless they could be physically 
                                                             




exploited in agriculture or construction (Thobani, 2007; as cited in CCR, 2000, para. 13).64  
The 1903 Chinese Head Tax, meanwhile, subjected Chinese immigrants to a 500$ fee 
should they wish to enter Canada, and in 1919 section 38 of the Immigration Act specified 
that Canada could “prohibit any race, nationality, or class” from settling (CCR, 2000, 
para. 29). Although these acts have been condemned as “shameful chapters” in Canada’s 
history, historical racisms continue through privatized immigration structures such as the 
TFWP, with migrants continually recruited according to explicitly racialized, gendered, 
and ableist requirements, typically charged huge sums of money on an ongoing basis in 
order to continually secure short-term work in Canada.   
Migrant workers are pointedly sought out according to region, moral character, 
race, gender, ability, and climate to qualify in Canada’s TFWP. Regarded as “suitable” for 
temporary labour, they are deemed “unsuitable” for permanent settlement or full status in 
Canada. Meanwhile, although there are no overt state requirements regarding race in the 
TFWP, the privatized and tied structure of the program has impelled the development of 
specific racialized and nationalized preferences for various occupations and employment 
sectors, as particular geographies, races, and genders become associated with particular 
jobs. For example, according to Kerry Preibisch (2007), Canadian employers consider 
Jamaican workers more suited to fruit tree picking, while Mexicans or Guatemalans are 
preferred for field harvests. One Guatemala-based agency that also recruits in Honduras 
specifically describe Honduran workers as “shit” while contrastingly referring to 
Guatemalan workers as “very, very good” – a sentiment that, according to the former 
director of the IOM-Guatemala, contributed to the development of a program in 
Guatemala over that of one in Honduras65 (agency 3, 03/22/14). If an employer deems a 
particular nationality or race to be “no good,” they have an endless pool of labour to 
choose from and may easily switch to a group deemed “more efficient” or “well-
behaved”.  
In confining migrant workers to particular “low-skilled” jobs that essentialize 
workers’ identities in Canada, racialized criteria is increasingly used and maintained to 
define spaces of exclusion through the migrant worker category. Certain types of bodies 
                                                             
64 Racial requirements were part of Canadian immigration policy until 1962. Some well-known pieces of racist 
legislation include: the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923, the Continuous 
Passage Requirement of 1908, the 1910 Immigration Act, etc. (Thobani, 2007; CCR, 2000).  
65 According to former IOM Director, the 2003 Pilot Program was also originally started with Honduras, but did 
not work. It then began again in 2010 with the opening of Amigo Laboral International Inc.  
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are deemed as exclusively fitting to low-wage work; and are only valuable as long as that 
work is needed. As such, bodies are only valued while they are able to efficiently perform 
“dirty, dangerous, and difficult” labour (Hennebry and Preibisch, 2010, 5). This plays out 
on a micro level as well, as particular identities and characteristics become associated with 
particular geographies in Guatemala, and particular groups hierarchically ranked above 
others in terms of their value for physical labour. With various gradations of “work ethic” 
or “docility” applied to entire racial groups, regions or nationalities, categorical racialized 
difference – marked by ideas of supposed racial expertise, skill, and behavior – is used as 
a labour management strategy, with groups and individuals often pitted against one 
another to compete for contracts.  
Meanwhile, agencies implement what workers call “military-style” physical 
examinations to evaluate candidates and narrow down who might qualify for a contract. 
Often designed by employers, these tests typically require male workers to perform heavy 
lifting, sit-ups, and run laps – with some agencies demanding hours of “volunteer” labour 
in agriculture, construction or landscaping – to observe a candidate’s physical capacity for 
carrying out tasks as they might occur in Canada. Examinations are paid for by workers 
and range in cost from 930Q to 80,000Q (~$150CAD to $12,940CAD),66 depending on 
the duration of the training, quantity of exams, or level of corruption of the labour broker. 
Tests and trainings are specifically gendered – related to a labour market that is explicitly 
segmented according to gender and race: while men are generally tested for strength and 
work in industrial agriculture or landscaping, women must carry out tasks that involve 
quick finger-work and are largely employed in laundry, strawberry picking, or the 
processing industry in Canada. One female worker reported having to repeatedly count 
corn kernels during a pre-departure training session (Guatemalan worker, 02/28/14). As 
described by one agency:  
Women are taught to practice an exercise to see how agile they are to separate 
a few things, like beans, rice, corn, or stones, or some fruit, to see what kind of 
ability they have in separating one thing from another, and how to count and 
package items, per dozen. It is an exercise to see their ability and 
concentration in how they work, and to see how capable they are of 
concentrating, to see who can make the least mistakes (agency 2, 03/18/14).  
 
                                                             
66 Classifying exams are also gendered, with women confined to tasks such as separating and picking 
berries, packaging, cooking for male workers, or washing laundry. 
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Meanwhile, with no limit to essentialized employer demands, employers may go so far as 
specify the dress, marital status, and family structure of the worker they are seeking: 
There are farms that ask that women come only from rural areas in 
Chimaltenango, wear their traditional dress, be single and without 
commitments67 (agency 3, 03/22/14).  
 
In contrast to Guatemalan men, who are wanted married, with children, often 
prohibited from forming relationships with women and generally criminalized as 
predators in Canada, some farms prefer that Guatemalan women be single and 
childless. In other words, certain kinds of family connections are desired and not 
others, depending on a candidate’s gender. Overall, women form a meagre fraction 
of the total workers who go to Canada from Guatemala, comprising just 3-5% of 
workers from 2003 to 2008, depending on the year (Hughes, 2014). This is because 
recruitment is explicitly gendered, largely limited to a pool of able-bodied men. Out 
of thirty-nine interviews with workers, only four identified as women, one of whom 
had never made it to Canada, while the remaining three had been waiting over a year 
to get a call from their agency in the hopes that they might eventually return to 
work.  
According to workers, agencies seek out those who have “Never been sick and never 
have broken a bone” (Guatemalan worker, 02/28/14). Searching for the perfect worker, 
agencies are able to design any pre-departure criteria as requested by Canadian employers 
or specific to the sector where workers are in demand, including mental and physical 
health, efficiency, speed, etc. As explained by one worker:  
Agencies carry out an exam on your ability, to see how well your brain works 
and how your hands move. If you’re in bad health, you can’t travel… [You 
also] need the mentality to go, and the physical ability to do it (Guatemalan 
worker, 01/14). 
 
Through observational tests and trainings, recruiters narrow down the most “hard-
working,” speedy, “moral,” or agriculturally experienced workers as those few who may 
go to Canada – who also appear to be guaranteed as temporary, with strong reasons to 
return – while the majority of those who have been enlisted and even paid fees remain in 
Guatemala.  
                                                             
67 In Guatemala, “without commitments” in this sense typically refers to being without kids or family 
obligations.   
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Employment agencies, meanwhile, may curb recruitment costs according to the 
projected salaries of workers in Canada, making particular kinds of work harder to access: 
It costs 30,000Q (~$5000CAN) to work in cattle in Québec. Cattle costs more 
to get into because the wages are higher, you make 13$ per hour (Guatemalan 
worker, 05/14). 
 
Costs vary widely, depending on the training and the sector, ranging from 250Q 
(~$40CAD) for just enlisting workers to over 30,000Q (~$5206.61CAD) if a worker 
would like to be trained in cattle. Once again, many workers must take out substantial 
loans to meet recruitment costs, either borrowing from family members, the bank, or 
labour brokers themselves, and often mortgaging their home and/or land. Meanwhile, 
nearly all workers interviewed cited (extreme) poverty and seeking a better life as their 
main reasons for joining the TFWP (See Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Interviewed Workers’ Reasons for Joining the TFWP 
 
 
Agency classifying mechanisms are used to convey and reproduce a particular – 
colonial-capitalist – order as demanded by Canadian employers and the Canadian state, 
and apply it to those who wish to be included in the migrant worker category. This is 
framed as a virtuous action on the part of agencies and employers, done in accordance 
with specific racialized criteria that differentially and hierarchically assign particular 
types of labour as belonging to particular types of bodies and geographies, and vice 
versa. Through the sorting of workers according to trainings, tests, region of origin, 
race, gender, and notions of morality and “honour,” distinct categories of labour – and 
people – are constructed and presented as belonging in distinct spaces and/or 










subject is actively created through the imaginations of exalted Canadian employers, 
intermediaries and the state, shaped as temporary, tied, without access to full status, 
and thus always excludable and disposable. This subject is reproduced on an everyday 
basis through the ongoing recruitment of Guatemalan workers to Canada. In order to 
remain in the migrant worker category, moreover, diverse identities must be enclosed 
and theoretically made “governable,” confined through the constant bordering – i.e. 
containment – of the good worker subject.  
 
CONTAINMENT: ORDERING “GOOD” MOVEMENT 
During pre-departure trainings, agencies give instructions as to how workers should 
behave in Canada. Workers are most commonly told they should be “obedient” towards 
Canadians, privileged to be labouring within a lawful Canada. In particular, one should: 
“be present, obey, follow-through, and tolerate – because there are a lot more 
obligations than rights” (agency 2, 03/18/14). Workers who speak out against 
dangerous or discriminatory working conditions, on the other hand, are identified as 
“bad” workers who have overstepped their obligations by “creating problems”: 
A worker’s responsibility is to work and to produce conscious labour, to be 
responsible with their employers, carry out the orders they’re given, not be 
provocative or problem-creating people, not get together in groups or organize 
protests, not say ‘I don’t want to work’ or ‘I want to go back to Guatemala’ 
because these are the people that create problems. We tell workers beforehand 
that anyone who does this will be expelled from the [work] site and returned to 
their country, and will have to pay all costs that the employer incurred as well 
as those that the agency paid for… The worker has more obligations than 
rights because he has the obligation to be present, to obey, to fulfill [his tasks], 
to withstand [work conditions] – there are a lot more obligations than rights. 
They don’t have the right to protest. Here we teach workers that they can’t 
protest, and they can’t demand anything. But they can ask politely (agency 2, 
03/18/14).  
 
Representatives express that they do not wish to hire “problem-creating people” – 
i.e. workers should follow employer orders over making demands or objecting to a 
task assigned to them, no matter the circumstances. Moreover, being “unable to 
enforce’ workers” obligations is cited as a root cause of “imbalances” in the TFWP: 
The Canadian companies comply with their obligations… the only problem is 
that we have no way to enforce workers’ obligations. This is not balanced. 
Everyone is talking labour workers’ rights but no one is talking about an 




In instructing how workers should or should not behave in the workplace, 
emphasizing the employer’s right to fulfill a contract, and demonizing workers who do not 
comply with categorical containment – i.e. the ideal qualities of the “good” worker: 
honest, honorable, moral, pristine legal status, consistent mental and physical health, 
obedient work ethic and a capacity to obey, good personal hygiene and eating habits, 
ability to withstand extreme weather, equipped with agricultural expertise, physical 
strength and endurance, etc. – as being “provocative,” agency representatives are 
prescribing those subjectivities that can fit into the migrant worker category. In doing so, 
they also reassert the position of the category itself which, as maintained by Sharma, is 
arranged in particular, hierarchically-organized ways in Canadian space, implying that an 
employer should be able to retain proper “control” over Guatemalan labour throughout 
workers’ time in Canada – for the supposed security Canada’s borders as well as for 
employer and agency profit (Sharma, 2006). Moreover, because the TFWP is a complaint-
driven system that, under the command of Canadian employers, puts workers at constant 
risk of deportation – and, subsequently, program blacklisting – agencies remind workers 
of the severe consequences that could arise should a worker deviate from the category that 
has been assigned to them.  
 With workers valued specifically in terms of their capacity for labour, 
commodification through the migrant worker category has been cited as central to 
the experience of many Guatemalan workers in Canada. Workers are given explicit 
instructions regarding personal hygiene, eating habits, and respecting the employer, 
and are prohibited from forming relationships outside of work, particularly, “with 
any group or association”. Demonstrating a “lack of respect” towards a Canadian 
employer or engaging in sexual relations is considered to be reasonable grounds for 
dismissal, deportation, blacklisting, as well as having to front travel costs to and 
from Canada (UFCW, 2013; IOM, 2010; See appendices iii and iv). One worker 
shares his own experience of commodification and expendibility:  
If you don’t want to do a particular kind of task, they threaten you and say that 
they’ll deport you to Guatemala, but you learn the work, and it’s okay, but 
when you have an accident, that’s when the employer and everyone turns…. 
When things are good, when you’re working for them, you’re a machine to 
make money, but once you’re sick, they want to kick you out like a disposable 




Another worker adds: 
In Canada, if you complain, it’s sure that you won’t have work the next day. 
Versus here in Guatemala, you can openly complain (Guatemalan worker, 
01/14). 
 
Agencies crusade to offer obedient, contained, temporary, “qualified human capital” 
to Canadian employers. Human capital that – in a “controlled,” orderly manner – will 
return to Guatemala following the end of their work contract. Spatial (and categorical) 
control is seen as a central component to the lucrative management of migrant workers for 
employers, agencies and the Canadian state. Workers must be temporary in order to be 
profitable (and in demand). To implement and guarantee temporariness, agencies claim to 
“protect and control” workers’ mobility when travelling to and from Canada, ensuring 
“that everything is in order” through centralized arrival and departure points – in some 
cases, even carrying out the devolved work of the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) with additional security checks (agency 6, 03/11/14).  
“Control” – in both the labour selection process and the transfer of workers to and 
from Canada – is effectively maintained through the elaborate management of workers, 
which is consolidated by each agency in a database system that centralizes participants’ 
information: 
In the database, every worker has a number, and each number has a commentary. 
For example, if someone only speaks Kachiquel, or measures 3’5 feet, or is 19 years 
old – when we usually work with people over 25, who have kids and a reason for 
returning, who aren’t going to go out at night and party. So we write down all the 
commentary and grade it, so like he’s an A+, he’s perfect, he’ll travel… when we 
put an A we’ll put a comment like he’s this height and weighs 90 pounds, etc. What 
we’re waiting for is more contracts to help another 100 people travel to Canada 
(agency 6, 03/11/14). 
 
Agencies use differential classification and training add-ons as a means to legibly 
organize candidates within their database and keep track of who is (not) “suitable” for 
work in Canada and who has (not) adequately completed recruitment procedures: 
The part of the work that we call classification is when we see if people are suitable 
to carry out the work, and if they’re not, well we train them so that they can become 
competent, so that they can move up and do this kind of work. When the worker has 
fulfilled all of the requirements of the organization, his paperwork and information 
goes into a database in Canada [with our Canadian counterpart]… I compile [all the 
worker’s information] and add it to the database. We have a list of all the workers, 
where they are from, what they can do… when a worker’s information is there, he 




Importantly, agencies also arrange which workers may return to Canada and which 
become blocked from the program as “bad” workers. With workers’ information and 
status organized in a central location, each agency is able to clearly decipher individual 
candidates and distinguish “Who is going [to Canada], who is not going, who is called, 
and so on”. Databases generally include a worker’s personal information, height, weight, 
family information (including brothers, sisters, or kids), education level, if they have ever 
been deported from the US, etc. and are often shared with a group’s Canadian counterpart. 
This is an instrumental tool in maintaining spatial control, managing mobility by 
intelligibly differentiating between “good” and “bad” workers and, in particular, “keeping 
out” blacklisted (“bad”) workers from the TFWP – who, according to agencies, may “try 
to lie and sneak back in” (agency 3, 03/22/14).  
“Good” workers are able to return to Canada through a “naming”68 process: upon 
their removal to Guatemala, workers are given a letter and evaluation to present to their 
agency, stipulating whether the worker was good and if they might be asked to return the 
following year. Some agencies are also directly given a recall list from Canadian 
counterparts or employers:  
We receive a recall list from [the Canadian agency], with an evaluation if the 
farmer said that the worker was good, for example, but if he doesn’t want the 
worker again, the farmer can recommend him to another farm, and in that case 
the worker joins the waiting list and he has an evaluation. We also have some 
workers that employers don’t want back and they don’t recommend him to 
another farm. And if [the worker is not recommended] they are out of the 
program, because we cannot place a worker if the employer says that he is no 
good (agency 3, 03/22/14).  
 
Recruitment officials emphasize the need for evidence of a worker’s “good” – or 
desirable – status if they have already worked in Canada:  
If the person is a good worker, they’ll have a letter with them that says they 
are going to be recalled the next year… if they don’t have this letter, then they 
can’t be called again, because the employer doesn’t want the worker back… If 
they’ve already gone to Canada, we need proof that they are a good worker 
(agency 1, 03/04/14, my emphasis). 
 
Without a direct channel of communication between employers and workers, workers 
often return to Guatemala without knowing for many months whether or not they will be 
                                                             
68 This term is used by both recruiters and workers in Guatemala.  
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rehired in Canada. Some interviewed workers reported having waited more than a year for 
a phone call from a recruitment representative, to no avail, and had thus started visiting 
other recruitment agencies in hope of being granted a new contract.  
Even if a worker is named as “good,” it does not mean that they will be returned or 
wanted by the same Canadian employer. Employers have the unrestricted power to refuse 
a worker for whatever reasons – without having to disclose them – and as such may also 
recommend someone to labour on a different farm, returning that worker to the wider 
waiting pool. Between growing recruitment and returning workers, waiting lists have 
rapidly expanded in recent years. Although there are no transparent numbers on the length 
of waiting lists, each agency reported possessing extensive lists of a few hundred workers, 
easily amounting to over two thousand candidates currently awaiting a potential contract 
in Guatemala and likely including many more. As expressed by an agency representative: 
We have people who are well prepared, who are waiting. Everything is ready 
here, we just need the boss in Canada to say, ‘I need 50 workers’ (agency 1, 
03/04/14). 
 
Dependent on market demand in Canada, a waiting worker must be prepared to 
hurriedly leave Guatemala if they suddenly receive a contract: 
It all starts when we call you. The point is to be available (agency 3, 
03/22/14).  
 
This demand-driven dynamic leaves at least hundreds – and likely thousands – of workers 
in limbo in Guatemala. Agency representatives only contact a worker if an employer has 
named them. To know if one has been named, recalled, or blacklisted, a worker must 
either make a visit to the recruiter’s office – which is typically many hours of travel from 
an individual’s community – or else eternally wait for a phone call from a recruiter 
explicitly expressing that the worker has been offered a new contract (Guatemala Ministry 
of Labour, 02/12/14). If workers do not obtain a contract, they simply do not hear from 
their agency. Workers are often given just a few days notice before they are set to travel to 
Canada, with little time for pre-departure arrangements and goodbyes. The possibility of 
re-obtaining a Canadian contract also impedes workers from securing work in Guatemala. 
An arbitrary, non-transparent process, naming (or lack thereof) acts as a means to silently 




FIGURE 9. ARE WORKERS RETURNING TO CANADA? (39 TOTAL) 
 
 
While thousands of Guatemalans are recruited to work in Canada each year, 
thousands also remain behind on waiting lists, part of a growing labour reserve or else 
targets of fraud. Blacklisting is discretionary and widespread, often occurring without 
even informing workers of the fact. “Bad” workers are produced by travelling to Canada. 
As explained by one agency: “We had to block 400 workers for protesting.”69 If a worker 
is unable to complete the duration of a contract for whatever reason, engages in a conflict 
at work, is not able to comply with work conditions, or suffers from an accident, they may 
be labeled a bad worker by their agency and permanently removed from the program. This 
has commonly included situations that are out of workers’ control, including but not 
limited to: mass layoffs in Canada due to economic decline, early end-of-season 
depending on weather, having to tend to a sick family member in Guatemala, standing up 
for access to medical care, etc. Workers in these situations have also been threatened or 
forced to pay additional costs associated with their removal. As described by former IOM 
staff: 
When a worker would breach a contract [under the IOM], even if it was for his 
wife or kids being sick, he would be kicked out of the program and 
blacklisted. With the case of the Association of Guatemalans United for our 
Rights… I’m sure that three-quarters of the cases [of blacklisted workers] 
were for stupid reasons. I’m sure (former IOM worker, 03/14). 
 
Common reasons for permanently removing workers from the TFWP include “low 
productivity” and “bad behavior” (OIM report, 2006, 33-34 & 2010; see appendices 
                                                             
69 Referring to the Association of Guatemalans United for our Rights (AGUND), a group of Guatemalan 
workers who have been organizing against program and agency abuses after having gone to Canada and not 
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4 and 5; various agencies). This is particularly problematic as, under the IOM as 
well as with current agencies, there is also a monetary incentive to blacklist workers: 
The IOM, as an NGO and a fund, was charging a deposit [of 4000Q] and 
removing people from the program without reason, so they were making a 
large sum of money (Guatemalan worker, 01/14).  
 
Under the pretext that it would guarantee workers’ return to Guatemala, the IOM 
charged workers a $660CAD deposit to go to Canada until 2010. If a worker’s 
contract was cut and ended earlier than expected, regardless of the reason, that 
deposit was regularly pocketed by the organization.  Since the elimination of the 
deposit, new means have emerged to continue levying worker payments, from the 
creation of a “service fee” to wide-ranging training programs. Most agencies are 
able to earn more by charging workers add-on recruitment costs in Guatemala than 
actually going to Canada to work. This has contributed to the recent surge in 
deregulated recruiters following the departure of the IOM from Guatemala. If an 
agency can fully charge a worker recruitment, training, and processing costs, 
blacklist that worker, and then charge a new worker these same costs, they are 
effectively able to make a higher profit margin than by merely returning the same 
workers year after year.70  
Although there are no available figures on the total number of workers blacklisted 
in Guatemala, each agency interviewed admitted to blacklisting workers for some of the 
abovementioned reasons, particularly if workers had engaged in a conflict or protest at 
work. With an overarching organizational “trust in employers” and no employers 
officially blacklisted from the program,71 agencies continue to maintain that the system 
functions in the interests and benefit of Guatemalan workers. However, it is “bad workers” 
rather than bad employers who are said to jeopardize the future of the TFWP – imperilling 
contracts and the production of capital – and so must be banned from the program to 
maintain an overall demand for Guatemalan labour. Moreover, although a handful of 
Canadian employers have been informally blacklisted by the Guatemalan Consulate and 
                                                             
70 This will be intensified now that the “four and four” rule has come into effect, forcing workers who have 
worked in Canada for four years (since April 1, 2011) to leave Canada for four years before they can reapply 
to the TFWP.  
71 Although an undisclosed list is kept by the Guatemalan Ministry of Labour, this is not public. Moreover, it 
has been recorded that even supposedly “blacklisted” employers have continued to recruit workers and in 
some cases be granted Canadian work permits and visas.    
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Guatemalan Ministry of Labour72, these employers have for the most part succeeded in 
continuing to source workers, with almost all agencies (eight out of nine) reporting to 
have worked with a blacklisted employer at some point or another. As expressed by a 
former IOM employee and current recruiting agent:  
There are a lot of farms that the IOM let go [overstepping regulations] over the 
years, and now they’re all part of the competition. Workers who slept in 
basements, on the floor, inhumane conditions, and well other agencies, for the 
money, [agencies] do business with [these farms] (agency 6, 03/11/14).   
 
As migrant workers take out heavy loans – often mortgaging their homes – 
to meet recruitment and travel costs, stakes are high if a worker is not able to make 
enough money to pay off the debts that they have accrued in Guatemala. With rising 
and variable costs for recruitment, a worker can be put into a very precarious 
position if they become blacklisted or waitlisted – that is, if they have actually 
succeeded in obtaining a Canadian contract in the first place. Meanwhile, many 
workers call their Canadian employers “racist and abusive,” citing discrimination, 
isolation and a lack of support while in Canada. Without any structural support 
mechanisms in place for workers, and with so many increasingly banned from 
participating, it is difficult to imagine how the TFWP could simply be the 
“humanitarian initiative to benefit workers” that agencies claim it to be. As rumours 
of well-paid work in Canada continue to spread far and wide, and fraud rates rise 
across Guatemala, more and more workers continue to be displaced by the 
burgeoning webs of made-in-Canada TFWP recruitment and its’ ever-expanding 
migrant worker category. As voiced by one worker: “Recruitment is a bad game, 
because you don’t know [if you’re really getting a job or not], and you can never 
know if it’s true or a lie” (Guatemalan worker, 01/14). 
                                                             
72 Although there exists a few Canadian companies that have been formally blacklisted by Canadian and 
Guatemalan governments for the labour abuses, this list is not public nor actively monitored and, as such, 
even blacklisted companies have succeeded in continuously obtaining Guatemalan labour.  
90 
 
Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to unmap the colonial ideologies and bordering 
practices that naturalize differential classification in Canada’s TFWP. Specifically, I have 
examined the narratives of recruitment actors to uncover how processes of classification 
and containment spatially and socially organize Canadian borders through mechanisms 
such as the TFWP, “managing” and categorizing subjectivities through the recruitment of 
migrant labour according to nationality, region, gender, race, physical ability, marital 
status, training, monetary investment, etc. This is necessarily grounded in colonial 
constructions of difference that facilitate exploitation and the apartheid of movement. 
Through an exploration of the everyday geographies of temporary labour recruitment in 
Guatemala, I have traced how notions of “lawfulness,” difference, morality, and order are 
used to manage and advance the racialization of labour and capital accumulation under 
temporary migration systems. Uncovering the institutional practices of neoliberal 
migration management structures illustrates how made-in-Canada forms of constructed 
precarity and lawful dispossession are also produced and normalized beyond Canada’s 
colonial borders.  
Researching the spaces and actors of temporary labour recruitment has allowed me 
to draw several conclusions from collected empirical material: described as a lawful, 
humanitarian initiative and also a business for Canada, the marketing of Guatemalan 
migrant labour to Canadian employers has entailed a growing “race to the bottom” as 
recruiters rush to compete for employment contracts. This has brought about a profusion 
of tests, trainings, and databases to rank workers, stratifying the pool of “ready” 
Guatemalan labour while augmenting costs – and creating excessive debt – for migrants. 
Although the bulk of recruitment in Guatemala remains concentrated in the hands of 
FERME’s Guatemalan counterpart, the rise of new recruitment groups has made it cheaper 
and easier for Canadian employers to source labour from Guatemala – including those 
already banned for labour violations. Recent “putting Canadians first” changes to TFWP 
legislation, meanwhile, have introduced migrant labour caps for the first time, quadrupled 
application costs, and put into effect the “four in and four out” rule, minimizing workers’ 
time in Canada while raising recruitment fees and lengthening blacklists – further 
disfranchising workers while continuing to frame state-designed temporary migration 
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itself as ethical movement for “the benefit of all”. As temporary labour becomes lawfully 
more precarious for workers, rumours of work in Canada continue to spread far and wide, 
driving thousands of migrants into conditions of deeper insecurity each year – as testified 
by Ana and so many others.   
At the same time, the migrant worker category – and the apartheid of mobility 
more generally – is constantly being constructed on a day-to-day basis both in Guatemala 
and Canada. Through the category of migrant worker, Guatemalans are legally excluded 
from full status in Canada, their visa bound to their employer and so constantly subject to 
the threat of deportation, without any path to permanent residency and limited access to 
social services or the benefits that they pay into. In charting the various steps that workers 
must undertake to be considered for a temporary labour contract, I have tried to depict a 
more expansive perspective of the making of difference through the transnational use of 
the migrant worker category, unsettling the boundaries of temporary labour by 
highlighting the production and management of the “good” worker subject in Guatemala. 
Through processes of classification and containment, “good” and “bad” migrants are 
constantly being positioned as either “deserving” or “undeserving” of work in an exalted 
Canada – work that they must pay to access, without a guarantee. Categorical difference, 
in turn, normalizes the very production of disparities through the social and spatial 
organization of Canadian borders.  
In being critical of recruitment and TFWP structures more generally, I wish to be 
clear that I am not suggesting that “low-skilled” temporary labour streams be abolished. 
“Low-skilled” streams provide important paths to work in Canada for thousands of 
migrants – just as “high-skilled” streams and other channels of migration to Canada are 
important for those who are able to access them. Most migrants who come to Canada as 
temporary workers only have access to just that: temporary labour streams. Blocking 
access to these channels – as begun under recent legislation – rather than creating 
meaningful paths to full status for all is a glaringly exclusionary and racist action on the 
part of the Canadian state. Rather, in critiquing recruitment and the migrant worker 
category, I am emphasizing the colonial, racialized, and gendered organization of 
Canadian borders and how the apartheid of movement is continually created and 
naturalized on an everyday basis, often with humanitarian undertones. Multi-tiered 
temporary labour streams are just one example of how the apartheid of mobility can be 
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produced and maintained. The classification systems that sort migrants into groups of 
“good” and “bad,” “authentic” and “inauthentic, ”“desirable” and “undesirable” more 
broadly uphold Canada’s immigration system and are rooted in realities of colonialism 
and commodification that divide and discriminate, with growing lists of “safe countries” 
creating “bogus refugees,” a narrowing of eligibility for family sponsorship, and new 
measures introduced for removing “fraudulent” im/migrants from Canada – from the 
rescinding of citizenship and permanent residency to rising numbers of people who are 
detained and deported each year.  
In writing this thesis, I have aimed to unsettle the production of difference by 
highlighting the narratives and processes of classification and containment which underlie 
the recruitment of Guatemalan migrant workers to Canada. This is grounded in a broader 
migrant justice framework that resists the colonially demarcated boundaries that have 
historically carved up Indigenous territories, dividing the “lawful” colonizer from the 
“lawless” colonized, to establish the very basis for global capitalism. Carlos Fernandez, 
Meredith Gill, Imre Szeman, and Jessica Whyte elaborate:  
Without the border, there would be no differential zones of labour, no spaces 
to realize surplus capital through the dumping of overproduction, no way of 
patrolling surly populations that might want to resist proletarianization, no 
realize valve for spectulative access (as cited in Walia, 2013: 71). 
 
Borders drive dispossession and deny self-determination, shaping geographies of access to 
constantly position migrants as “out of place”. There are over a billion migrants around 
the world, 740 million of whom are migrant workers (Walia, 2013). Colonial states 
increasingly tighten and subcontract the regulation of non-White mobility – i.e. migration 
management – to for-profit actors, promoting the economic appropriation of claims to 
movement of the majority of the world’s population. Although the managed migration of 
“foreigners” – whose status will always be temporary – is a profoundly colonial and often 
violent process, it is carried out under the banner of being lawful and “good”. This 
exacerbates possibilities for exploitation and consolidates relations of domination, as the 
apartheid of movement and the disposability of workers is continuously presented as 
natural and even charitable. As expressed by Haudenosaunee scholar Audra Simpson 
(2014): it is in “appearing virtuous” where the power of colonial violence lies. In claiming 
legality and virtuosity, migration management actors effectively multiply the scales for 
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racial governance and capital accumulation, expanding the frontiers of dispossession and 
displacement through the steady denial of self-determined movement.   
Narratives of national belonging, in turn, continue to powerfully shape the 
production and normalization of the apartheid of movement in Canada, configuring access 
to land, territory, and status. The continual erasure of colonialism and propagation of 
settler mythologies in dominant discourse allows for the very organization of hierarchical 
categories of (White) belonging, fashioning possibilities for im/mobility and lawful 
violence through Canada’s immigration system. Settler colonial narratives promote the 
free flow of capital over the free movement of people, advancing the commodification of 
resources, land, and movement through an exclusionist concept of the nation-state. The 
envisioning of a world without borders, therefore, must begin with recognizing and 
unlearning these – as well as other – forms of colonial violence, re-imagining and 
deconstructing the hierarchies of colonial control that perpetuate categorical difference to 
instead support the freedom of all to move, to remain, and to return. As voiced by 
Indigenous youth from the Akimel, O’odham, and Tohono O’oham nations: 
[We must] return to traditional indigenous values of freedom and 
movement for all people. Prior to the colonization by European 
nations and the establishment of the European settler state…and 
the artificial borders it and other European nation states have 
imposed; indigenous people migrated, traveled, and traded with 
each other without regard to artificial lines drawn on maps… 
[I]mmigration policies dehumanize and criminalize people 
simply because of which side of these artificial lines they were 
born on. White settlers whose ancestors have only been here at 
most for a few hundred years have imposed these policies of 
terror and death on ‘immigrants’ whose ancestors have lived in 
this hemisphere for tens of thousands of years, for time 
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Appendix 1: Annual entries of temporary residents in Québec, 2000-2010  
 
Figure 1 : “Annual entries of temporary residents in Québec according to 
status for top three countries”  




Figure 2 : “Annual entries of temporary residents according to status for 
countries of origin of top three countries, Québec, 2000-2010”  





Appendix 2: Number of Guatemalan Migrant Workers to Canada in 2013 under Amigo 




Appendix 3: Linguistic Map of Guatemala 
 
 





























































































































Appendix 7: Agency Interview Guide 
 
Cuestionario: agencias de contratación 
 
1. ¿Cuándo y por qué se formó la empresa?  
 
2. ¿Qué es su misión como organización/empresa? ¿Siempre han tenido la misma 
misión? ¿Cómo ha cambiado? [¿Es para la ganancia o no-lucrativo?] 
 
3. ¿Que servicios proporcionan ustedes? [¿Si proporcionan algo más que un 
servicio de contratación a Canadá?] 
 
4. ¿Cuántos empleados hay en la organización? ¿Todos tiene papeles distintos? 
¿Cómo es la estructura de la organización? ¿Cómo cambia por temporada? 
 
5. ¿Tuvieron alguna relación con el proyecto anterior de la OIM-Guatemala? Si sí, 
¿cuál?  
 
6. Para formar la empresa, ¿tuvieron el apoyo de organizaciones gubernamentales 
o no-gubernamentales (sea en Guatemala, Canadá, u otro lugar)? Si sí, ¿cuáles? 
¿Qué tipo de ayuda? ¿Siguen trabajando con esas mismas organizaciones? 
 
7. ¿Su organización está registrada como empresa guatemalteca o canadiense? 
¿Tiene licencia para trabajar en Guatemala? ¿En Canadá? [¿Cómo qué tipo de 
empresa, pueden legalmente reclutar a personas aquí en Guatemala?] 
 
8. ¿Cómo es su relación con el Ministerio de Trabajo, el Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, y/o la Embajada Canadiense?   
 
9. ¿Envían los contratos de trabajo/o avisen las fechas de salida al Ministerio de 
Trabajo o al MRE aquí en Guatemala? O ¿tienen algún tipo de contacto habitual? 
¿Por qué? 
 
10. ¿Su organización tiene contactos con empleadores o agencias canadienses? 
¿Cuáles? ¿Donde están? ¿Cuántos contratos tienen? ¿Prefieren trabajar con 
agencias o directamente con empleadores? ¿Por qué? 
 
11. ¿A dónde mandan gente a Canadá? [provincia, una sola empresa/agencia, solo 
en agricultura u en otros sectores] 
 
12. ¿Me puedes describir qué es el proceso de contratación, a partir de la demanda 
de finqueros en Canadá hasta que se envía trabajadores allá? ¿Esperan hasta 
que reciben una demanda de Canadá para contratar a alguien aquí, o tienen una 
‘reserva’ de trabajadores listos para irse?  
 
13. ¿Qué son los pasos que hay que cumplir acá en Guatemala para mandar a gente 
a Canadá? (Reclutamiento, evaluación, contratación, el viaje, el retorno, etc.) 
 
14. ¿De las solicitudes totales de visas que solicitan a la embajada canadiense, 
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15. ¿Ha cambiado los requisitos de visa [desde 2003, o desde que comenzaron sus 
operaciones]? ¿Cómo? 
 
16. ¿Cuánta gente ha mandado a Canadá desde su inicio hasta ahora? ¿Cuánta en 
2013? ¿Cuánto este año [2014]?  
 
17. ¿Su organización hace visitas a comunidades? Si sí, donde? ¿Cómo escogen a 
que comunidades van a visitar? ¿Solo llegan de una vez para establecer 
contactos, o vuelvan a visitar? ¿En qué regiones está concentrado el trabajo que 
hacen ustedes?  
 
18. ¿Qué son los requisitos para ir a trabajar a Canadá? (Conocimientos, 
características específicas, preferencia por hombres o mujeres, etc.) ¿Quién 
decide sobre esos requisitos?  
 
19. ¿Cuántos clientes/trabajadores tienen en este momento? De estos clientes, 
¿cuántos están aquí en Guatemala esperando una llamada, cuantos están en 
una lista de espera, y cuantos ya están en Canadá?  
 
20. ¿De donde vienen la mayoría de sus clientes? (Departamentos, municipios, el 
Occidente o el Oriente) ¿Por qué vienen de esos lugares? 
 
21. ¿Que son los tramites que hay que cumplir un trabajador para poder viajar a 
Canadá? [Si tiene que llegar a la oficina, ¿cuantas veces hay que volver para 
hacer transmites antes de irse a Canadá?] 
 
22. ¿Qué costos tiene que pagar el trabajador? (exámenes médicos, visa, seguro, 
depósitos, curso de capacitación, uniformes, etc.)  
 
23. ¿Cuánto se cobra a trabajadores para el ‘servicio de asistencia’ para llegar a 
Canadá’? ¿Cuánto a empleadores o agencias [por trabajador]?  
 
24. Si el trabajador tiene que pagar un seguro médico, ¿en qué consiste este seguro, 
como funciona, porque lo tiene, y con que compañía de seguro trabajan ustedes? 
 
25. ¿Los trabajadores tienen que participar en algún curso de capacitación? ¿Si sí, 
en qué consiste esta formación/capacitación? ¿Cuesta algo? 
 
26. ¿Cuánto tiempo se da como advertencia/aviso a trabajadores antes de que se 
van a Canadá?  
 
27. ¿La mayoría de los que van a trabajar a Canadá vuelven para trabajar muchos 
temporadas, o solo van de una vez? ¿Por qué? 
 
28. ¿Cómo se contrata de nuevo a un trabajador? ¿Si un empleador no decide hacer 
volver a su trabajador, como informan ustedes al trabajador de esa decisión? 
¿Los trabajadores quienes no han estado llamados se quedan en un listado para 
más tarde en la temporada, o el próximo año, o son permanentemente excluidos 
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29. ¿Existe alguna “lista negra” de trabajadores que ya no pueden volver a Canadá? 
Si sí, ¿cómo funciona eso o en qué consiste? 
 
30. Como agencia de contratación, ¿como ve su papel frente a los derechos 
laborales de los trabajadores? ¿Es su tarea informar a los trabajadores de sus 
derechos en Canadá? ¿Por qué o por qué no?  
 
31. Como agencia, ¿apoyan a trabajadores mientras que están en Canadá? ¿Cómo? 
 
32. ¿Cuándo los trabajadores vuelen a Guatemala después de que terminen su 
contrato, siguen estar en contacto con ellos? ¿Cómo? 
 
33. ¿Cómo crees que sería mejor el proceso de mandar trabajadores a Canadá? 
[Algún convenio, el papel de la embajada, el gobierno guatemalteco, algún tipo de 
apoyo, etc.] 
 





Appendix 8: Worker Interview Guide 
 
Cuestionario: trabajadoras y trabajadores  
1. ¿De donde vienes/eres?  
 
2. ¿Porque decidiste ir a trabajar en Canadá? 
  
3. ¿Cómo conseguiste el trabajo o cómo te enteraste de la posibilidad de ir a 
trabajar a Canadá? 
 
4. ¿Que eran los requisitos para entrar? ¿Qué conocimientos te pidieron para el 
trabajo? ¿Hay preferencia por hombres o mujeres, o características especificas 
(sea física, experiencia, etc.)? 
  
5. ¿Cuanto tiempo tuviste que esperar aquí en Guatemala antes de irte para 
trabajar allá? [¿Cuántas temporadas tienes allá?] 
 
6. ¿Tuviste algún contacto o relación con funcionarios o representantes de 
organizaciones canadienses antes de irte a Canadá? Si sí, ¿quienes/cuales? (el 
gobierno, algún ONG, etc.) 
 
7. ¿Qué gastos tuviste que pagar y a quien?  (exámenes médicos, visa, seguro 
médico familiar, etc.) ¿No te pidieron dinero por otra cosa? 
 
8. ¿Cuándo fuiste a la OIM, Amigo Laboral, etc. o a la embajada canadiense, como 
te trataron?  
 
9. ¿Había otra gente de tu comunidad que fue a Canadá contigo? ¿Hombres o 
mujeres?  
 
10. ¿Antes de viajar, te han dado información sobre las instituciones laborales y de 
apoyo que hay y puedes tener aquí en Guatemala y en Canadá? 
 
11. ¿En dónde trabajaste en Canadá? ¿Qué tenías que hacer en tu trabajo? 
  
12. ¿Cómo te pagan? ¿Por hora o por libra/cuantidad de producto? ¿Quincenal, 
mensual? 
 
13. ¿En general, como ha sido la experiencia de trabajo?  
 
14. ¿Has tenido algún problema o conflicto mientras trabajabas en Canadá? ¿Cómo 
se resolvió? 
 
15. ¿Tuviste relaciones con gente fuera del trabajo? ¿Era algo prohibido? (¿Alguien 
te dijo de no relacionarte con ciertos grupos o personas en Canadá?)  
 
16. ¿Siempre viajas con la misma agencia, al mismo trabajo? 
 
17. ¿Sabes si vas a volver? Si sí, ¿quien se comunica contigo para decirte si o 




Appendix 8 (continued) 
 
 
18. ¿Amigo Laboral u otras agencias han vuelto a visitar a tu comunidad o solo 
llegaron de una vez? 
 
19. ¿Como te identificas? ¿Como Maya, mestizo, ladino? ¿Qué idioma hablas o cuál 
es tu idioma Materno?  
 
20. ¿Como crees que sería mejor ir a trabajar a Canadá? 
 
21. ¿Algo más que te gustaría añadir? ¿Preguntas, comentarios? 
 
 
